Annex A — C-IED Action Plan

The five-year C-IED Action plan describes what JIEDDO must do to achieve the C-IED Strategic Plan goals and objectives. It is designed to transform strategic guidance into specific, effective, and measurable actions to fulfill JIEDDO’s mission as DoD’s lead to rapidly provide C-IED capabilities and solutions in support of the Combatant Commanders, the Services, and as authorized, other federal agencies to enable the defeat of the IED as a weapon of strategic influence.

This annex details the specific tasks, outcomes, responsibilities, actions, and outputs required to achieve JIEDDO’s five goals and associated objectives.

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<th>Goal 1: Rapidly identify, validate, and prioritize immediate and future C-IED requirements to enable Combatant Commanders to effectively attack complex IED production and support networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; and employ a trained force capable of addressing the IED threat.</th>
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<td>Goal 2: Provide operations and intelligence fusion, analysis, training and sensitive activity support to the Combatant Commanders, federal agencies, and coalition partners to enable freedom of action from IEDs and to enhance a collective ability to counter threat networks and supporting activities.</td>
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<td>Goal 3: Rapidly seek, develop, and acquire C-IED solutions to fulfill validated requirements that ensure a Combatant Commander’s ability to effectively attack complex IED production and support networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; and employ a trained force capable of addressing the IED threat.</td>
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<td>Goal 4: Lead DoD C-IED training and training capability development that supports the Joint Staff, the Services’ and Combatant Commanders’ efforts to prepare forces to successfully attack the network and defeat the device in the contemporary and future operating environment.</td>
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<td>Goal 5: Build a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and international C-IED Community of Action through collaborative planning, information sharing, and cooperative capability development for discrete IED problem sets (e.g., homemade explosives (HME), domestic threat, partner C-IED capability development).</td>
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The C-IED Strategic Plan (including this Action Plan) informs and provides general guidance to the JIEDDO Planning Process (JPP), the JIEDDO C-IED Capability Development Process (JCDP), and the JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAAMP) (see Annex B). In addition, the Strategic Plan will highlight C-IED outcomes to prepare the Annual Report and other reports as required.
Goal 1: Rapidly identify, validate, and prioritize immediate and future C-IED requirements to enable Combatant Commanders to effectively attack complex IED production and support networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; and employ a trained force capable of addressing the IED threat.

JIEDDO supports the Combatant Commanders’ and partner nations’ war-fighting efforts by conducting global studies, analysis, and assessments and evaluating plans, programs, and National and Combatant Commanders’ strategies for C-IED operational needs and required capabilities. JIEDDO rapid acquisition processes attempts to offset an adversary’s asymmetric combat advantage of employing IEDs through compressed acquisition, fielding and training. JIEDDO’s actions reduce risk to operational commanders and ensure essential freedom of maneuver for combat forces.

- Objective 1.1: Support the validation of current and emerging Combatant Commanders’ requirements to ensure priority capability gaps are being addressed.

JIEDDO evaluates and assesses emergent Combatant Commander’s requirements against metrics such as risk to the Combatant Commander’s mission, risk to own forces, availability of other resources, and operational timelines. In a resource restricted fiscal environment, a holistic evaluation is conducted ensuring the most effective capabilities are realized.

Objective MOE: 100% of Combatant Commander requirements are identified and prioritized within 60 days of validation by the Combatant Commander

- Task 1.1.1: Institutionalize the JIEDDO Capability Requirement Validation (CRV) process to include the JIEDDO Operational Requirements Assessment Board (JORAB).

Discussion: The JIEDDO Operational Requirements Assessment Board (JORAB) is the forum where requirements are discussed and a validation decision is made for JIEDDO to accept a requirement. JIEDDO ensures the Urgent Capabilities Based Assessment that feeds the JORAB for each requirement is complete by coordinating with internal and external organizations. Effective relationships are required with the Service Labs, Service Acquisition Organizations and stakeholders (i.e., Rapid Equipping Force (REF), Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO), Armament, Research, Development Center (ARDEC), Army Adaptive C-IED/EOD Solutions (ACES), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, US Navy OPNAV N8, US Air
Force A8, etc.) and their participation is essential to complement existing efforts and provide for efficiencies.

Outcome: C-IED requirements leading to capabilities that can be institutionalized within the Services.

Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDRR

Partners – J-3, DDRAT, DDT, DDOI, other federal agencies

  Output: An SOP that documents the JORAB and CRV process.

- Action 1.1.1.2: Establish relationships with Service Lab and key stakeholders to participate in the JORAB in order to have input to the C-IED requirements validated by JIEDDO.
  Output: Coordinated requirements and solution development leading to C-IED capabilities that can be institutionalized by the Services.

- Action 1.1.1.3: Ensure external stakeholder organizations have access to all JIEDDO requirements.
  Output: The JIEDDO Enterprise Management System (JEMS) is updated and maintained to show all JIEDDO requirements. Key stakeholders have access to view JEMS.

- Task 1.1.2: Develop and maintain a comprehensive inventory of C-IED capability gaps. (Supports task 5.2.3 and CTUE IP tasks 1.3.4 and 1.3.5)
  Discussion: C-IED capability gaps drive CCDR requirements for JIEDDO to develop solutions. JIEDDO maintains and continually updates these gaps with the input from the CCDRs, the Services and other key stakeholders to ensure that the C-IED requirements are aligned against them and capabilities are developed to address these gaps.

Outcome: A comprehensive inventory of DoD and interagency C-IED capability gaps.

Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Medium Term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDRI

Partners – DDIEM, DDRAT, DDT, DDOI, other federal agencies

- Action 1.1.2.1: Develop, maintain and regularly update the inventories of C-IED-related capability gaps.
  Output: A regularly updated C-IED capability gap inventory that identifies the originator, type of gap, and priority of gap.
Action 1.1.2.2: Provide the ability for CCDRs, Services, and key stakeholders to submit and analyze information on C-IED-related capability gaps with associated requirements and capabilities.
Output: An online collaboration tool that enables end users and partners to respond to requests for information on C-IED-related capabilities and assets.

Action 1.1.2.3: Provide the ability for JIEDDO, CCDRs, Services, and key stakeholders to assess C-IED capability gaps to determine C-IED requirements.
Output: An assessment methodology that is able to demonstrate C-IED capability gaps in need of further development of requirements.

Objective 1.2: Determine both current and future required capabilities by identifying threat-focused operational needs and capability gaps to rapidly respond to dynamic C-IED needs.

Threat assessments are the bedrock analytical foundation for the C-IED acquisition processes and for discovering capability gaps. Essential to identifying operational needs is a thorough understanding of IED threat systems that could be used against US and partner nation forces. The threat analysis includes use of validated scenarios where the enemy uses IEDs to hamper US and partner nation forces freedom of maneuver. Scenarios used in C-IED threat assessment include traditional, irregular, and humanitarian relief operations. Finally, proliferations of new technologies are assessed for their potential use in manufacturing IEDs.

Objective MOE: Critical R&D needs are identified, defined, prioritized, and communicated to the R&D community of interest.

Task 1.2.1: Develop and maintain capability roadmaps, based on anticipated advances in threat IED capabilities, to determine future C-IED requirements. (Supports CTUE IP task 1.3.3)
Discussion: Understanding threat IED capabilities is essential to defeating them. C-IED capability roadmaps define the scope and operational requirements needed to achieve future capabilities and outline the means to build outcomes which address future threat environments. The roadmaps consider information such as capability development and analysis data, inventories of ongoing activities and intelligence reporting.
Outcome: C-IED capability roadmaps that provide R&D guidance for current and future capabilities. The roadmaps will be informed by current and anticipated IED threat capabilities.
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Medium Term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDRR
Partners – J-3, DDRAT, DDT, DDOI, other federal agencies
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- Action 1.2.1.1: Develop relevant C-IED capability roadmaps by leveraging JIEDDO and partner networks to establish a C-IED community of interest (COI), which includes interagency partners.
  Output: An annual, coordinated, interagency process to review operational needs, identify technological and other shortfalls and coordinate R&D efforts to overcome priority gaps.
- Action 1.2.1.2: Facilitate assessments on trends in threat use of IEDs and support analysis of emerging threat capabilities to inform C-IED capability roadmaps.
  Output: Accurate threat assessment and intelligence analysis that supports development of C-IED capability roadmaps which address current and anticipated IED-related threat tactics; updated quarterly.

- Task 1.2.2: Develop a comprehensive C-IED capabilities development process which includes the collection, analysis and assessment of DoD and interagency partner C-IED operational needs. Identify shortfalls and redundancies in C-IED planning, equipment, training and RDT&E and recommend solutions and mitigation approaches. (Supports CTUE IP tasks 1.3.2 and 1.3.4)
  Discussion: End users of national and military C-IED capabilities enablers are best suited to articulate their operational needs, but they require a comprehensive process for integrating those needs into C-IED research and development. This integration process must determine required C-IED capabilities by collecting and analyzing end users’ input, while also assessing both current and anticipated advances in threat IED capabilities. The required capabilities defined in this process can then be mapped against a fully developed inventory of current C-IED enablers and RDT&E programs to identify capability shortfalls. Identification of these shortfalls facilitates informed recommendations on the investment of resources.
  Outcome: A fully-enabled C-IED capabilities development process, with all necessary policies established and systems developed to determine specific, mission-essential, DoD and interagency C-IED operational needs and required capabilities, identify shortfalls and make recommendations.
  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDRR
    Partners – J-3, DDRAT, DDT, DDOI, other federal agencies
- Action 1.2.2.1: Determine required capabilities and compare to a comprehensive inventory of DoD and interagency C-IED capabilities to identify shortfalls, gaps and redundancies in both capabilities and RDT&E initiatives.
Output: A list, updated quarterly, of required C-IED capabilities and shortfalls.

- Action 1.2.2.2: Make recommendations for enabling required capabilities, mitigating shortfalls and working with relevant partners to develop and deploy new solutions.
  Output: Recommendations which include development of new solutions, maximizing efficiencies of available systems and an assessment of ongoing RDT&E efforts.

- Action 1.2.2.3: Oversee a C-IED capabilities assessment program to identify the operational needs within DoD and among interagency partners.
  Output: A regularly-updated assessment of DoD and interagency C-IED operational needs.

- Action 1.2.2.4: Define policies to apply JIEDDO processes to external stakeholder organizations.
  Output: Vetted business rules for applying the C-IED capabilities development process to all DoD and interagency C-IED needs.

Task 1.2.3: Develop and maintain a comprehensive inventory of capabilities and assets, including RDT&E related to countering threat IED capabilities and TTPs. (Supports CTUE IP task 1.3.1)

Discussion: Many partners, both within and outside of DoD, are not aware of existing C-IED capabilities, assets, training, exercises, analysis programs, authorities and RDT&E initiatives. A readily-accessible, comprehensive inventory of current C-IED efforts, capabilities and assets will enhance awareness for end users, partners and other members of the community of interest (COI). Once established, the inventory can be assessed against national priorities and identified required capabilities to ensure the appropriate investment of resources.

Outcome: A comprehensive inventory of DoD and interagency C-IED capabilities, including RDT&E related to preventing, detecting and responding to the IED threat, is developed and maintained.

  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timeline: Medium Term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead –DDRR
  Partners –DDIEM, DDRAT, DDT, DDOI, other federal agencies

- Action 1.2.3.1: Develop, maintain and annually update the inventories of C-IED-related capabilities and assets.
  Output: A regularly-updated C-IED capabilities inventory that identifies, at a minimum, the responsible Federal organization, a point of contact, the
purpose of the initiative, funding status and the intended customer, where applicable.

- Action 1.2.3.2: Provide the ability for end users and partners to submit and analyze information on C-IED-related capabilities and assets.
  Output: An online collaboration tool that enables end users and partners to respond to requests for information on C-IED-related capabilities and assets.

- Objective 1.3: Prioritize acquisition decisions to support C-IED requirements to ensure investments are made with the greatest impact for the warfighter. U.S. and partner nation forces will continue to be engaged in irregular warfare operations such as peace-keeping, humanitarian relief, and counter insurgency operations. C-IED capabilities, training, and strategy must proactively orient and develop to confront the greatest threat from adversaries. JIEDDO must ensure C-IED capabilities maximize the Combatant Commanders’ competitive edge over an agile enemy by anticipating operational needs providing the greatest C-IED effects in a resource constrained environment.
  Objective MOE: An established prioritization methodology that provides standardized and repeatable investment decisions.

- Task 1.3.1: Develop prioritization models and processes that are repeatable for threats, gaps, requirements, initiatives and R&D areas. \((\text{Supports CTUE IP tasks 1.3.4 and 1.3.5})\)
  Discussion: To effectively optimize the Joint IED Defeat Fund (JIEDDF) to provide the warfighter with required capabilities, JIEDDO must be able to prioritize C-IED related threats, gaps, requirements and initiatives. This will ensure that there is a continuous benchmark for JIEDDO investments and enable JIEDDO to deliver the necessary capabilities to the warfighter in a resource constrained environment. Prioritization will also enable periodic portfolio reviews to check alignment against actual investments.
  Outcome: A fully enabled prioritization process, with all necessary policies established and systems developed to regularly determine highest priorities and guide investment decisions.
  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDRR
  Partners – J-3, DDRAT, DDT, DDOI, other federal agencies

- Action 1.3.1.1: Develop prioritization models for threats, gaps, requirements, initiatives, and R&D areas.
  Output: Decision Lens models that can be quickly updated and utilized for voting priorities.
Objective 1.4: Ensure resources are justified and applied to ensure congressional approval of resource allocation to rapidly develop and field C-IED capabilities.

JIEDDO is aware of the dynamic nature of the geopolitical situation required to support DoD’s C-IED activities and programs. Each C-IED capability investment strategy must be supported by evidence showing how this capability counters the current threat, the highest risk of IEDs to US and partner nation forces, and enduring challenges. Ultimately, C-IED investments must justify the allocation of resources in relation to meeting DoD’s objectives, missions, and tasks.

Objective MOE: 100% of JIEDDO funding supports prioritized JIEDDO mission capabilities in order to identify and field C-IED initiatives.

Task 1.4.1: Develop Strategic guidance for programmatic action.
Discussion: DoD objectives, CCDR requirements as articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance, and historical execution history together with strategic vision must be used to develop a plan that meets operational and infrastructure needs through the programming period. An executable, operationally sound, rational and defensible plan is required to efficiently move from current execution to future objective achievement.
Outcome: Defense Strategic Planning Guidance that directs funding for critical JIEDDO requirements.
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – J-8
Partners – J-5, J-3, Congressional Affairs

Action 1.4.1.1: Develop J-8 input for Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) in coordination with JIEDDO staff and Combatant Commands for JIEDDO and Combatant Command equities.
Output: JIEDDO suggested input for Combatant Commanders’ Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs).

Action 1.4.1.2: Identify JIEDDO strategic goals to DoD for inclusion into DoD strategic guidance documents.
• Task 1.4.2: Develop Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to support organization mission requirements.
Discussion: In order for the organization to establish a stable, predictable, and useful resource stream, a programmatic funding line that establishes and supports critical functions is needed. This stable, predictable funding line helps leaders to articulate needs, develop plans, understand senior leadership goals and objectives for the organization, and helps formulate a glide path to organization outcomes.
Programmatic resourcing provides the basis for assessing where the organization has been, where it is headed, and provides a sound baseline for on-going, re-evaluation of strategic plans.
Outcome: POM Submission that incorporates Strategic Planning Guidance for all levels, and produces an executable plan for achieving organizational strategic and near-term goals.
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead -- J-8
Partners – J-5, J-3
  o Action 1.4.2.1: Using JIEDDO and DoD strategic guidance, develop programmatic (POM) requirements position for the organization.
  Output: POM Brief to DoD (or Executive Agent as appropriate)
  o Action 1.4.2.2: Defend POM requirements and articulate critical funding needs.
  Output: Recommendations which include development of new solutions, maximizing efficiencies of available systems, and an assessment of ongoing RDT&E efforts.
  o Action 1.2.2.3: Oversee a C-IED capabilities assessment program to identify the operational needs within DoD and among interagency partners.
  Output: A funding line that provides programmatic resources for critical organizational needs.

• Task 1.4.3: Using the POM as a baseline, develop a budget justification for CY+2 (Current Year Plus two).
Discussion: In order to build and defend a budget, JIEDDO must take the programmatic position, and put it into the format required by the OSD Comptroller. This document is the basis for the final OSD analysis of the JIEDDO requested resources before being provided to Congress. JIEDDO must then articulate the
adjusted budget position to Congress to obtain the needed resources to execute the plan for that FY.

Outcome: A fully justified budget submission to Congress.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead –J-8

• Action 1.4.3.1: J-8 will compile a list of programs and requirements that will require funding in the budget year.
  Output: A list of all requirements, by line of operation (LOO), for the budget year.

• Action 1.4.3.2: J-8 will analyze inputs and develop a budget based on approved bottom line funding directed by OSD, and compile a budget book.
  Output: Budget Justification Submission to OSD Comptroller.

• Task 1.4.4: Using Resource Management Decisions, Program Budget Decisions, and Program Decision Memoranda, adjust and update the justification and compile a Congressional Budget Book to be included with the Department’s President’s Budget Submission to Congress.

  Discussion: Budgeting includes formulation, justification, execution, and control of the budget. It is a process for justifying to OSD and Congress the rationale to allocate necessary resources in accordance with the law.

  Outcome: President’s Budget Submission with integrated DoD C-IED priorities.

  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead — J-8

• Action 1.4.4.1: JIEDDO, using the justification material submitted to OSD, adjusts the budget material to take into account directed changes by OSD, and incorporating the most up to date material depicting organizational estimates on projects and base requirements, and maintaining OSD directed bottom lines, produces a Congressional Budget Submission for inclusion in the President’s Budget Submission by OSD.

  Output: A compiled and published President’s Budget Submission that depicts JIEDDO plans and resource requirements for the FY.

• Objective 1.5: Conduct assessments that enable transition, transfer, termination, or continuing (T3C) decisions within 24 months from initiatives origination to institutionalize C-IED capabilities and ensure the JIEDDO investment is leveraged for the future.

  JIEDDO coordinates and collaborates with the Services and Combatant Commanders for all C-IED capabilities technology development, integration, demonstration, and production.
JIEDDO supports the capability for 24 month which allowing the capability to prove the merits of its design in a realistic operational environment. After 24 months, JIEDDO capabilities that reflect a high level of technical and operational maturity to the combat force are institutionalized as Service Programs of Record. Key to the assessment is that the capability meets the war-fighter’s requirements at acceptable cost and with adequate reliability. Initiatives which fail to meet the CCDR’s operational needs are terminated.

Objective MOE: 100% of all initiatives are technically and operationally assessed within 24 months of first MIPR.

- Task 1.5.1: Conduct initiative health assessments.
  Discussion: Initiative health assessments determine if a capability is successfully demonstrated. It also evaluates the cost, schedule, and technical performance of each initiative. By conducting regular initiative health assessments using the JIEDDO Assessment Methodology (JAM), JIEDDO can accurately determine if a capability is technically proven.
  Outcome: Health (cost, schedule, technical performance) of each initiative assessed regularly through the JAM. Determination of “technically proven” is made based on JAM.
  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDRAT
  Partners – DDRR, J9
  o Action 1.5.1.1: Conduct JAM evaluation for all new initiatives.
    Output: JAM evaluation updates provided for each initiative.
  o Action 1.5.1.2: Inform T3C Integrated Process Team (IPT) of “technically proven” status as it occurs.
    Output: T3C IPT has visibility on technically proven initiatives.

- Task 1.5.2: Conduct external assessments.
  Discussion: An initiative’s performance in theater determines if it is operationally proven. In addition to determining if an initiative is technically proven, it is important to determine how well initiatives perform in operational settings with the many external factors associated with an operational environment.
  Outcome: External assessments are conducted on each fielded initiative to determine if it is operationally proven.
  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead —DDRR, J9
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- Action 1.5.2.1: Conduct regular assessments of each initiative’s operational effectiveness after fielding.
  Output: J9’s bi-weekly briefings to director include assessments of initiatives’ operational performance.
- Action 1.5.2.2: Inform T3C IPT of “operationally proven” status as it occurs.
  Output: T3C IPT has visibility on operationally proven initiatives.

- Task 1.5.3: Obtain endorsement letters from the CCDR for initiatives that are technically and operationally proven.
  Discussion: After an initiative is technically and operationally proven through JIEDDOs initiative health assessments and external assessments, endorsement from the applicable CCDR should be obtained to determine if an initiative is a proven capability.
  Outcome: Combatant Commanders’ assess fielded C-IED systems and technologies and makes a T3C recommendation to the Director.
  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timeline: Medium Term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDRR
  Partners – DDRAT
- Action 1.5.3.1: Work with CCDRs to obtain endorsement letters for qualifying initiatives.
  Output: CCDR endorsed proven capabilities.
- Action 1.5.3.2: Inform T3C IPT of “proven” status as it occurs.
  Output: T3C IPT has visibility on proven initiatives.

- Objective 1.6: Direct, monitor, and modify, as necessary, activities, regarding the WTI process as they pertain to the collection, technical and forensic exploitation, and analysis of IED components to swiftly enable force protection, targeting, component and material sourcing, and expeditious support to prosecution. Establish the standards processes and procedures required for the application of forensics to WTI collection, analysis, and exploitation.
  JIEDDO’s Weapons Technical Intelligence activities conduct technical and forensic collection and exploitation of IEDs. Intelligence harvested through WTI processes supports development of C-IED international and domestic strategies and capabilities, TTPs, force protection initiatives, targeting of networks and individual users, financial sourcing centers, and prosecution. Absent the benefits of WTI activities, combat forces are reduced to “goal line defenses” to allow freedom of maneuver and fighting an enemy with unending sources of asymmetric combat strengths.
  Objective MOE: WTI architecture has been created, synchronized, and institutionalized by the DoD and interagency partners as an enduring capability.
Task 1.6.1: Lead, manage, and provide oversight of all JIEDDO WTI activities. 
Outcome: WTI initiatives are fully synchronized within JIEDDO. 
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability) 
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome) 
Roles: Lead – DDRR (WTI) 
Partners – J5, J3, J6, DDT, DDOI, DDRAT

- Action 1.6.1.1: Communicate requirements for materiel and non-materiel capabilities to DDRAT; assist DDRAT in developing and acquiring solutions to the requirements; and coordinate solutions through the JCAAMP process to ensure full integration into the larger WTI architecture. 
Output: Requirements are rapidly addressed with the proper CIED solutions.

- Action 1.6.1.2: In conjunction with the DDT, ensure that exploitation and C-IED skills are standardized and institutionalized into the appropriate training forums. 
Output: Joint Training programs of instruction incorporate standardized exploitation and C-IED skills.

Task 1.6.2: Coordinate and synchronize WTI and IED exploitation initiatives across DoD, interagency, and international domains. (Supports CTUE IP task 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.) 
Outcome: Enduring WTI capabilities facilitate the timely collection, analysis, and technical and forensic exploitation of current and emerging IED technologies in order to swiftly enable force protection measures, component and material sourcing, targeting, the countering of threat networks, and support to prosecution. 
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability) 
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome) 
Roles: Lead – DDRR (WTI) 
Partners – J5, DDIEM, DDRAT, DDOI, DDT, and J3

- Action 1.6.2.1: Coordinate and chair WTI integration meetings and working groups to provide a forum for cross-JIEDDO coordination and DoD and interagency dialogue on WTI issues and efforts. 
Output: Quarterly WTI community of practice (COP) working group and monthly IPT meetings as needed to address WTI issues.

- Action 1.6.2.2: Support efforts to standardize terminology and reference with regard to WTI within DoD, and support similar efforts across other government agencies and with international partners.
Output: Updated lexicons, handbooks and related materials for training and exploitation, and harmonization of terminology used in whole of government efforts and with partners.

- **Action 1.6.2.3**: Represent JIEDDO in DoD efforts to institutionalize an enduring forensic and technical exploitation capability for WTI, its enablers, and related capabilities through the provision of advisory and C-IED subject matter expertise to DoD components, other government agencies, and international entities.
  
  Output: JIEDDO advisors and subject matter experts provide support to other DoD, interagency, and international partners as required.

- **Action 1.6.2.4**: Assist partner agencies and the Services in establishing a WTI Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) to coordinate, synchronize and integrate WTI policies, capabilities and key mission enablers within DoD and across the interagency.
  
  Output: JPMO functioning within 6 months of WTI Document Change Request (DCR) approval.

- **Action 1.6.2.5**: Support the development of WTI doctrine and policy to provide a coordinated, focused, and holistic approach to WTI as an enduring capability.
  
  Output: WTI-related directives and issuances updated to reflect its status as an enduring capability; ad hoc WTI processes translated into formal doctrine and policy.
**Goal 2: Provide operations and intelligence fusion, analysis, training and sensitive activity support to the Combatant Commanders, federal agencies, and coalition partners to enable freedom of action from IEDs and enhance a collective ability to counter threat networks and supporting activities.**

In support of all Combatant Commanders, the Deputy Director of Operations Intelligence/Integration (DDOI) serves as Director of Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center (COIC) whose mission is to harness, mass, and fuse information, analysis, technology, interagency collaboration and training support to enable more precise attacks to defeat violent extremist networks. The COIC is prepared to provide Attack the Network (AtN) analytics, technology and training support to other US Government Organizations and Coalition partners, when authorized.

- **Objective 2.1:** Man, train, and equip a scalable, deployable, highly-qualified workforce in order to sustain Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) integration support and global contingency operations.

  In order to properly support the CCDRs the COIC shall create and sustain organic services support capabilities which enable a highly skilled and trained work force, with scalable human resource management to support contingency operations. COIC will use decentralized hiring practices, rapid acquisition authority, resource management, security, facilities management and space acquisition, intelligence oversight and contract management as driven by operational requirements.

  Objective MOE: COIC deploys trained and qualified personnel.

- **Task 2.1.1:** Ensure the DDOI workforce structure is correctly organized and staffed with full authority to meet both functional and operational requirements.

  Discussion: In order for the DDOI to respond to CCDR and other government agencies request for support, the COIC and other elements reporting to the DDOI, must have a workforce properly staffed and trained to accomplish the functions as outlined in the JIEDDO Organizational and Functions Guide.

  Outcome: Manpower and manning structure is approved by an accrediting agency (e.g., US Army Manpower Analysis Agency).

  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)

  Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)

  Roles: Lead – DDOI (COIC Mission Support Division – MSD)
Partner – COIC All

- Action 2.1.1.1: Fill all DDOI expeditionary billets.
  Output: Key and essential billets are filled.
- Action 2.1.1.2: Complete and implement annual reviews of DDOI Manpower expeditionary capability.
  Output: Reviews are staffed and completed and the organization is adjusted accordingly.

- Task 2.1.2: Provide sustained contingency contract support with the expertise, flexibility and responsiveness to meet the operational requirements in a timely manner.
  Discussion: In order for the DDOI to respond to changing CCDR requirements, the ability to respond with the proper personnel and support equipment in an expeditious manner is essential. Having contracts in place with the flexibility to expand to met new requirements aide in the ability to provide timely support.
  Outcome: Contract office personnel are certified/warranted to manage and award the necessary types of contracts (Time and Materials (T&M), Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF), & Firm Fixed Price [FFP])
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (MSD)
  - Action 2.1.2.1: Enable and manage flexible contingency contracts to meet changing requirements.
    Output: Contract capacity is sustained to allow for optimum flexibility.
    (Contract capacity is the weighted average number of months that current COIC contracts can support known requirements).

- Task 2.1.3: Obtain budget authority to rapidly resource DDOI functional, operational, and R&D requirements.
  Discussion: Budget authority will enable a more expeditious execution of financial actions of approved budgetary items.
  Outcome: Programming and Budgeting authority resides at DDOI Command Group.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (MSD)
  - Action 2.1.3.1: Obtain and maintain JIEDDO authority to operate a separate DDOI (COIC and Sensitive Activities) budget to resource dynamic requirements.
    Output: DDOI has budget authority.
- Task 2.1.4: Develop appropriate internal mechanisms (e.g., knowledge management system and processes) to ensure the automated flow of requests and information is available as required.
  Discussion: The COIC requires one application that links multiple business information sources. This application or database will enhance the efficiency of the workforce while increasing the accuracy of data.
  Outcome: Relational database that links Human Resources, Contracting, and Budget information to assist in decision process.
  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (Net-Centric Innovation Division — NID)
        Partner – DDOI (MSD)
  o Action 2.1.4.1: Develop and field an Oracle-based enterprise-wide database.
    Output: Oracle-based database is fielded and operational.

- Task 2.1.5: Develop network attack curricula and sustain training support to COIC personnel.
  Discussion: One of the COIC functions is to develop new tools and methods for information fusion to counter threat networks. As these tools and methods are developed, personnel will require refresher training. The curriculum for the tools will need to accompany these new developments to ensure their proper implementation.
  Outcome: COIC personnel are properly trained and certified to perform analytical and operational functions required.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (Training Integration Division — TID)
        Partner – COIC All
  o Action 2.1.5.1: Develop an effective sustainment training curriculum.
    Output: Validated programs of instruction are established.
  o Action 2.1.5.2: Deliver curriculum.
    Output: The volume of courses delivered and individuals trained meets requirements.

- Objective 2.2: Provide operationally relevant and timely operations-intelligence fusion and analytical support, and training integration in order to enable Combatant Commanders to attack threat networks.
The COIC shall create and sustain a multi-domain analytical capability which includes all source and open source intelligence, operations research and systems analysis (ORSA), network and pattern analysis, and operations and intelligence fusion in response for request for service as driven by operational requirements. In addition, COIC will sustain a training integration capability (fixed, mobile and virtual) which integrates blue-red AtN tactics, techniques, and procedures in a curriculum to support unit pre-deployment and home station training and integration into doctrine. The COIC will provide deployable highly skilled CIED attack the network advisors and trainers.

Objective MOE: Products support CCDR activities within negotiated Latest Time of Value (LTOV). Deployed units receive AtN training (Conventional, SOF, Joint, Interagency and Coalition).

- Task 2.2.1: Produce high quality fused products and analysis as requested from customers within customer specified time. *(Supports CTUE IP task 2.2.2)*
  
  Discussion: The COIC directly supports the tactical commander by providing fused intelligence based on specific requests for information. Feedback from customers on delivered products aide in provided future support and the proper training of analyst providing the support.
  
  Outcome: Customer feedback verifies timely quality products.

  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)

  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

  Roles: Lead – DDOI (MID)
  Partner – DDOI (TID), DDOI (Data Analysis Research and Collaboration — DARC)

  - Action 2.2.1.1: Use leading edge technology to ensure accuracy of fused intelligence.

    Output: Analysts use a task-oriented multi-source decision tool that provides the right information at the right time; provides a more complete set of information; minimizes individual bias; and, saves the analyst valuable time.

  - Action 2.2.1.2: Conduct analytical and tool refresher training for intelligence analysts and operations integrators.

    Output: Based on training survey results, analytical and tool refresher training is consistent with mission requirements.

  - Action 2.2.1.3: Apply customer satisfaction surveys for product improvement.

    Output: Improved products integrate customer feedback.

- Task 2.2.2: Provide direct theater support with trained personnel and equipment to enable fused intelligence and analysis, sensitive activity support, and C-IED advisory support.
Discussion: The COIC is tasked with providing direct support to the tactical commanders in the field. This requires trained personnel, equipment and communications linkage to enable in theater support and reach-back assistance.
Outcome: Manpower and equipment are in CCDR required theater locations.
Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDOI (OPS)
Partner – DDOI (NID), J-3(JET)
• Action 2.2.2.1: Deploy trained JIEDDO COIC Analytic Support Team (JCAST), Global Enterprise Partnerships (GEP), C-IED Technical Support Element (CTSE) and Joint Expeditionary Team (JET) personnel as authorized.
Output: Personnel trained and deployed to requested locations
• Action 2.2.2.2: Deploy required equipment to support customer requirements.
Output: Sufficient equipment deployed to customer locations.
• Action 2.2.2.3: Maintain equipment in an operational status.
Output: Full Mission Capable equipment is available and deployed or ready to be deployed.

• Task 2.2.3: Conduct Attack the Network (AtN) training and C-IED advisory support. *(Supports CTUE IP task 2.2.5)*
Discussion: The COIC provides AtN training to units during the pre-deploying training exercises utilizing the curriculum developed the COIC TID. This training provided covers the concept of AtN and tools available and how to receive reach-back support.
Outcome: COIC Attack the Network training curriculum is integrated across the Services.
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDOI (TID)
Partner – J-3 (JET), DDT (Training Support Element — TSE) & DDT (Joint Center of Excellence — JCOE)
• Action 2.2.3.1: Develop and maintain AtN curriculum.
Output: Validated AtN programs of instruction are established and maintained by number and types of course produced.
• Action 2.2.3.2: Provide AtN trainers at service readiness training exercises.
Output: The volume of courses delivered and individuals trained meets requirements.
• Action 2.2.3.3: Provide training AtN support and C-IED advisory capability.
Output: AtN training support and C-IED advisory capabilities by number of events meet the demands for service.

- Task 2.2.4: Create a responsive, deployable multi-level DDOI-support capability. 
  Discussion: This capability is required to support CCDRs not currently engaged in combat. Having the capability to quickly respond to the next contingency requires the training staff and equipment staged and ready. 
  Outcome: DDOI-in-a-box equipment and personnel roster is in place and ready to be executed. 
    Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability) 
    Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome) 
    Roles: Lead – DDOI (NID) 
    Partner – DDOI (MSD & OPS) 
      o Action 2.2.4.1: Develop a rapid and scalable staffing plan. 
        Output: Plan is staffed and approved. 
      o Action 2.2.4.2: Rapidly procure, stage, and be ready to deploy equipment. 
        Output: Equipment is procured, stored and plan is in place to sustain.

- Objective 2.3: Innovate and improve Information Technology infrastructure and analytical methods in order to enhance collaboration in fully established and austere environments. 
  The COIC shall create and sustain information technology enabling capability (base/exportable high speed computing, high/low bandwidth network communications, software development with secure enclave for rapid testing and evaluation, collaborative tools, knowledge visualization applications for shared global situational awareness) as driven by operational requirements. 
  Objective MOE: Operational Availability (Ao) of the COIC Tools, Network and Global Enterprise Partnerships meets mission requirements.

- Task 2.3.1: Design and deploy enterprise architecture compliant with DI2E framework in order to facilitate multi-agency, cross-departmental, and coalition collaboration. (Supports CTUE IP task 2.2.3) 
  Discussion: The COIC must establish an information technology infrastructure that is flexible to enable customer support in established bases to the tactical field environment. This infrastructure must also have the ability to expand and connect to multiple data sources. 
  Outcome: Enterprise IT architecture is fully compliant with DI2E framework. 
    Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability) 
    Timeline: Long term (between three and five years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDOI (NID)

- Action 2.3.1.1: Create and execute a roadmap for new enterprise architecture.
  Output: A road map is created for new enterprise architecture. (In compliance with DI2E Standards: a) # Designed / Total; b) # Deployed / Total.)

- Task 2.3.2: Adapt existing legacy applications and develop new analytical tools in accordance with MID and customer identified gaps, within the Ozone Widget Framework (OWF) in order to provide state of the art AtN tools and capabilities to tactical edge and to make them available to the C-IED AtN community of interest.
  Discussion: The Ozone Widget Framework (OWF) is a visualization framework geared towards the evolution of web applications away from traditional stove-piped architectures and towards open, scalable, and user-centric architectures. This framework enables rapid development of new analytic tools to support count network analytic activities.
  Outcome: New analytic tools are fully integrated with the OWF.
  Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
  Timeline: Long term (between three and five years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (NID)
  - Action 2.3.2.1: Create and execute a roadmap that modifies existing analytic tools to new framework.
    Output: AtN tools and capabilities are upgraded and available as specified in accordance with the approved roadmap.

- Task 2.3.3: Create and foster software development environment that allows for agile and raid development, testing, accreditation, and deployment of C-IED and AtN tools and capabilities.
  Discussion: To provide the best possible support to the warfighter, the COIC must continue to be innovative in analytic tool set development. The ability to rapidly develop and deploy these new tool sets are critical to staying abreast with the latest technology.
  Outcome: Software fielding timeline exceeds DoD Standards.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (NID)
  - Action 2.3.3.1: Streamline software accreditation process.
    Output: The accreditation process is streamlined for rapid development and deployment of software (e.g., average length of time in accreditation pipeline).
Task 2.3.3.2: Provide analytic tools to warfighters.
Output: Appropriate analytic tools are fielded in a timely manner (e.g., high customer satisfaction rating for COIC Tools).

Task 2.3.4: Continue to improve and evolve the Global Enterprise Partnership (GEP) capabilities in order to allow for improved intelligence agencies, DoD, and CCDR collaboration, SOF data integrations, and access to COIC AtN tools and methodologies.
Discussion: Sharing information is key to countering threat networks. The implementation of GEP and supporting the TSOCs with integration of COIC tools, personnel and methodologies will continue to evolve.
Outcome: Seamless integration between COIC and GEP partners with regard to data, tools, and methodologies.
  Priority: Maintaining (maintains existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (NID)
  o Action 2.3.4.1: Field fully manned and equipped GEP nodes to partners.
    Output: GEP staffing is complete and equipment is maintained and operational.
  o Action 2.3.4.2: Transfer/transition GEP capabilities to host partners
    Outputs: MOA’s signed and executed for transfer of GEP capabilities.

Task 2.3.5: Define and implement the COIC technology insertion roadmap in order to improve collaboration and decision making.
Discussion: The COIC is constantly reviewing the current capabilities and researching new solutions to existing technology. Each technology should clearly identify the path toward and improve the overall decision making ability of the COIC.
Outcome: COIC technology initiatives are fielded on-time and within budget and positively affects the collaboration and decision-making process.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDOI (MID)
  Partner – DDOI (OPS, MSD & NID)
  o Action 2.3.5.1: Establish a COIC Situational Awareness Room.
    Output: The COIC Situational Awareness Room is up and operational.
  o Action: 2.3.5.2: Create and execute a roadmap that modifies existing analytic tools to new framework.
    Output: Analytic tools and capabilities are upgraded and available as specified in accordance with the approved roadmap.
• Objective 2.4: Build partnerships to enable global threat information sharing, analysis, and collaboration in order to leverage and focus a whole-of-government effort.

The COIC shall establish partnerships and agreements that enable information and intelligence collection, analytical support, and bilateral information sharing which may include the provision of personnel and computing, software, communications support with geographical CCDRs, other government agencies, academia, and the defense industry.

Objective MOE: Participating CCDRs, Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), selected members of the intelligence community (IC), interagency organizations (IA), academia, and coalition partners sign memoranda of agreement (MOAs) and fulfill commitments (measured by percentage of established and compliant compared to required).

• Task 2.4.1: Establish MOAs with each geographic CCDR, their respective TSOC and USSOCOM that address C-IED collection, integration, fusion, analysis, dissemination, training, communications, computing and tools.

Discussion: A detailed MOA between the CCDR, the associated TSOC and the COIC lay the foundation of the expectations and outline the roles and responsibilities of each party.

Outcome: Percentage of MOAs in full compliance.

Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)

Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead – DDOI (OPS)

Partner – JIEDDO J-5, J-3 (CCDR Integrators)

Action 2.4.1.1: Draft and staff required CCDR, TSOC and USSOCOM MOAs.

Output: Required CCDRs, TSOCs and USSOCOM MOAs are signed and in effect.

• Task 2.4.2: Establish MOAs with interagency partners to collaboratively engage in the C-IED/counter-network effort. (Supports CTUE IP tasks 1.2.1, 2.2.3, and 2.2.5)

Discussion: Detailed MOAs between the COIC and interagency partners lay the foundation of the expectations and outline the roles and responsibilities of each party.

Outcome: Fully compliant MOAs are established with interagency partners (measured by percentage of established and compliant compared to required).

Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)

Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead – DDOI (OPS)

Partner – DDOI (MID) & J-5
Action 2.4.2.1: Establish MOAs with IC/IA partners as required including other agencies engaged in homeland security that enhance C-IED capabilities of U.S. civil authorities.
Output: Required MOAs signed and in effect.

Task 2.4.3: Expand partnerships with coalition nations.
Discussion: The C-IED successes in Afghanistan and Iraq were, in many cases, the result of strong relationships with coalition partners. Continued sharing of information and access to intelligence products will build upon these achievements and provide positive long-term outcomes.
Outcome: COIC has established data-sharing relationships with coalition nations (measured by percentage of established and compliant compared to required).
Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDOI (OPS)
Partners – DDOI (MID, NID & TID) & JIEDDO J5

Action 2.4.3.1: Establish Coalition MOAs to include LNO/Exchange Officers as directed.
Output: Required MOAs signed.

Action 2.4.3.2: Acquire robust access to coalition databases.
Output: COIC has increased access to coalition databases.

Action 2.4.3.3: Increase the availability of pertinent COIC products on the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN)/Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) and the Joint IED Analysis Centre (UK) (JIEDAC).
Output: COIC has increased the volume of products with coalition nations on AMN/BICES and JIEDAC.

Task 2.4.4: Establish liaison programs and information sharing with university consortiums (Harvard, MIT, University of Central Florida, and Stanford).
Discussion: JIEDDO has engaged academia for assistance in developing scientific solutions to the counter the IED threat. As the COIC looks for new analytic tools and techniques in data mining and analysis, expanding our relationship with universities who are conducting this type of research may speed this development and implementation.
Outcome: Analytic solutions acquired from university consortiums are integrated into COIC analytic tools.
Priority: Beneficial (enhancing existing capability)
Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDOI (OPS)
    Partner – DDOI (TID, DARC)
  o Action 2.4.4.1: Continuously expand agreements with academia to improve analytic techniques and data ingestion and visualization capabilities.
    Output: Agreements with academia are expanded. New analytic solutions from academia are introduced.

  • Task 2.4.5: Integrate best practices in Attack the Network methodology within joint doctrine and with an IC/IA training community of interest.
    Discussion: The COIC maintains its AtN training curriculum current by inserting lessons learned from COIC internal staff and input from supported services. The COIC continues to engage the services and intelligence training community to ensure that AtN best practices are standardized across the community.
    Outcome: COIC best practices incorporated across DoD and with the Joint Force training environment.
    Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
    Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
    Roles: Lead – DDOI (TID)
    Partner – DDOI (OPS, MID & NID), DDT (JCOE, TSE)
  o Action 2.4.5.1: Provide training programs of instruction (POIs) and training opportunities to the Services, IC, IA and coalition training organizations.
    Output: Training organizations have access to and understand COIC best practices.
  o Action 2.4.5.2: Participate in regular Attack the Network conferences (Coalition, Services, IC and IA).
    Output: Training partnerships established. COIC participates in regular AtN conferences.

  • Objective 2.5: Maintain a global knowledge base of current and future IED threats in order to provide solutions to counter friendly vulnerabilities.
    A global cross-agency IED threat repository to aid in closing C-IED gaps and vulnerabilities is required to inform C-IED stakeholders to make the best requirements determination and acquisition.
    Objective MOEs: CCDRs are appropriately enabled to understand the threat network (includes requested access datasets availability across NLAN, SLAN and TLAN).

  • Task 2.5.1: Create and sustain a global IED integrated operations and intelligence picture. (Supports CTUE IP task 2.2.3)
Discussion: A global picture of current and future IED threats will help determine how best to use the JIEDDO C-IED portfolio.
Outcome: Global common operating picture (COP) with daily or as necessary updates is established and fully functional with appropriate participation.
Priority: Enhancing (enhances existing capability)
Timelines: Long term (between three and five years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDOI (NID)
Partner – DDOI (OPS & MID)
   o Action 2.5.1.1: Create and execute a roadmap for fielding the integrated IED COP.
     Output: An integrated IED COP is established and functional in accordance with the published timeline and milestones.
   
   Task 2.5.2: Identify and gain access to classified and open source data sets (at the tactical, operational, and strategic level) to support the COIC analytic mission.
Discussion: Understanding the appropriate data sets and establishing access to those data sets are important to effective analytic support to the warfighter. The establishment of MOAs with partners for information sharing benefits both JIEDDO and our partners in mission support.
Outcome: The necessary datasets are available and accessible to support the COIC analytic mission.
Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timelines: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDOI (MID)
Partner – DDOI (OPS, NID & DARC)
   o Action 2.5.2.1: Identify and access the datasets that are necessary to support the COIC analytic mission.
     Output: Sufficient datasets available for mission support.
   o Action 2.5.2.2: Establish CCDR, IC and other relationships to support rapid access to critical datasets to support future contingency operations.
     Output: All necessary MOAs are signed and in effect.

Objective 2.6: Provide sensitive activities support in order to enable Combatant Commanders’ and other federal agencies’ counter IED efforts.

The DDOI shall advocate and focus JIEDDO sensitive activity involvement to ensure that C-IED-relevant sensitive activities and special access capabilities are identified, developed or leveraged, assessed, and integrated into DoD and CCDR C-IED plans and activities while being properly protected within associated JIEDDO processes. Under the oversight of the JIEDDO Sensitive Activities Review Group, the DDOI shall manage the JIEDDO Special Access
Program (SAP), Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJ[STO]), and sensitive activity infrastructure programs, facilities, information technology, and contract support. 

Objective MOE: Designated Combatant Commands sustain sensitive activities.

- Task 2.6.1: Provide C-IED relevant sensitive activities and special access support to Combatant Commanders.
  Discussion: The JIEDDO sensitive activities are on a need to know basis and currently supporting CCDR theater activities.
  Outcome: In accordance with CCDR requirements and priorities, C-IED enabling activities support deployed unit’s mission accomplishment.
  Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
  Timelines: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles – Lead: DDOI (Sensitive Activities)
  - Action 2.6.1.1: Create and execute a roadmap for supporting sensitive activities.
    Output: Sensitive activities and special access reporting program is established and functional in accordance with the published timeline and milestones.
  - Action 2.6.1.2: Deploy trained CTSE personnel for sensitive C-IED planning and implementation.
    Output: Trained CTSE personnel are deployed to support designated forces in accordance with CCDR priorities.
**Goal 3:** Rapidly seek, develop, and acquire C-IED solutions to fulfill validated requirements that ensure a Combatant Commander’s ability to effectively attack complex IED production and support networks; detect and neutralize IEDs; and employ a trained force capable of addressing the IED threat.

The enemy force that employs IEDs on today’s battlefield is a thinking enemy able to adapt quickly and innovatively; adjusting tactics and techniques swiftly in response to fielded countermeasures adopted by U.S. and Coalition Forces. The enemy is not restrained by a lengthy or complicated materiel acquisition system to employ weapons in today’s conflicts. This enemy is constantly modifying their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in order to become more effective, more lethal, and to strategically alter the way we fight. This constant change drives a unique and specific set of capabilities to combat the IED threat and requires a unique process to seek, develop, and acquire C-IED solutions.

Efforts to field proven C-IED capabilities revolve around a rapid acquisition system. The Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Process (JCAAMP) is JIEDDO’s process to respond to C-IED urgent needs; identify operational capability gaps; aggressively seek, acquire, and assess potential solutions to these needs and gaps through extensive finding networks; and place approved initiatives in the hands of the warfighter.

- Objective 3.1: Develop, procure, implement, evaluate and deploy C-IED solutions to enable offensive operations against networks; ensure freedom of action and effective operations for commanders; and enable deploying forces to mitigate the impact of IED employment.

US forces face a continuously changing enemy, adaptable to any situation and environment, and positioned to use all types of technologies (from low to high tech) in the employment of IEDs. The current DoD decision-making processes: requirements generation, defense acquisition management and financial management, are not configured to meet the flexibility and adaptability of the enemy’s use of IED technologies. To meet this threat, now and in the future, resources must be more efficiently and effectively used to design, develop and produce quality systems to ensure that only necessary and cost-effective capability requirements are included at the most appropriate time in the acquisition cycle.

Objective MOE: 90% of proven C-IED capabilities drive down effective attacks.

Outcome MOE: Effective execution- 90% of new solicitations and contract actions are completed and/or awarded with minimal work stoppages related to inefficient contract administration or management strategies.
• Task 3.1.1: Lead organizational efforts to rapidly identify, develop, evaluate, and deploy C-IED solutions in order to overcome material and non-material capability gaps. (Supports CTUE IP tasks 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4)
Discussion: JIEDDO must successfully lead acquisition and evaluation activities between developer, project manager, warfighter and the Services, as well as effectively leverage strategic planning and engagement efforts to integrate emerging technologies and concepts in the development of C-IED solutions.
Outcome: The percentage of initiatives in the solution domain in compliance with planned acquisition strategy (cost, schedule and performance threshold), is within a 10% margin.
Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead — DDRAT
  • Action 3.1.1.1: Integrate acquisition and evaluation activities between developer, project manager, staff, warfighter, and Services, in order to provide rapid deployment of enhanced warfighter capabilities.
    (Role: Lead – Technology Requirements Integration Division [TRID])
    Output: Synergistic approach to fulfilling warfighter’s C-IED requirements. Proven C-IED solutions (80% of required performance) deployed to theater within 24 months for an operational assessment of the capability under combat conditions. The warfighter (end user) provides input in regards to performance, to facilitate further development of performance and transition to a Service as a supporting capability.
  • Action 3.1.1.2: Ensure C-IED solutions include robust and effective new equipment training, sustainment, maintenance, feedback, and product improvement in order to enable warfighters (users) to use materiel and non-materiel solutions efficiently and effectively to minimize/ mitigate the impact of IEDs. (Role: Lead — TRID)
    Output: Pre-planned Product Improvement (P3I) program that develops the 20% of performance that is not achieved due to criticality of schedule in meeting warfighter’s requirements. Identify of 15% of systems as training assets. A transition plan that addresses sustainment cost estimates of the Service.

• Task 3.1.2: Develop and execute processes that support overcoming material and non-material capability gaps by ensuring efficient and effective flow of initiatives through JCAAMP; conduct robust evaluation of initiatives and smooth transition and transfer of proven C-IED capabilities.
Discussion: JIEDDO must successfully employ the JCAAMP to be successful in integrating emerging technologies and concepts into the development of C-IED solutions. 
Outcome: 90% of proven C-IED capabilities are terminated, transitioned or transferred to a Service or agency within 24 months of the first MIPR or as dictated by the acquisition strategy.
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves national capability)
Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead — DDRAT
  o Action 3.1.2.1: Institutionalize C-IED capabilities within the Services in order to ensure mission capable focus worldwide. (Role: Lead — Acquisition Evaluation Division [AED])
    Output: C-IED capabilities transitioned to Services through JROC Memorandum in sufficient time to enable the Services to program resources in the POM.
  o Action 3.1.2.2: Conduct continuous evaluation of initiatives in order to demonstrate proven C-IED capabilities. (Role: Lead — AED)
    Output: Test data acquired throughout the lifecycle of the initiative, from contractor tests through Government-sponsored operational assessments. Traceability matrix ensures that performance requirements are addressed and evaluated through multiple test events, providing the evaluation data that will support the military utility of the system.
  o Action 3.1.2.3: Identify and rapidly mature potential solutions from the broad R&D community in order to provide C-IED capabilities to the CCDRs as soon as possible. (Role: Lead — Technology Development Division [TDD])
    Output: A list of potential R&D technologies and capabilities that might close the R&D capability gaps developed by DDRR. The list is disseminated through multiple venues (e.g., finding network, communities of interest, JIEDDO Technology Outreach Conferences (JTOC) to qualify proposals and efforts.

  • Objective 3.2: Aggressively seek innovative C-IED solutions requiring research and technology maturation and prioritize them within DoD to advance capabilities required for the future.

  The IED threat, both current and future, and the short timeline required to develop technologies to meet these threats, does not allow JIEDDO’s Capabilities Acquisition Center (CAC) to invent new processes or methodologies. Existing DoD and industry processes must be modified, accelerated and innovatively used to fit the rapid acquisition philosophy of JIEDDO. Through a proactive and dynamic workforce, JIEDDO uses existing ideas and processes to
identify requirements, determine how best to meet these requirements (rapid procurement or rapid development), deploy the system for testing, and achieve objective performance levels.

Objective MOE: Mature S&T efforts to the appropriate technology readiness level (TRL) for disposition to TRID, COIC, JCOE, or to a Terminate or Continue decision.

- Task 3.2.1: Lead organizational efforts to build the informational networks that provide access to cutting edge research and development with government, industry, and academia.
  Discussion: Leverage relationships with other government agencies, industry and academia in order to support the exchange of emerging technologies and concepts.
  Outcome: 10% of all companies participating in each outreach event submit a proposal.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead — DDRAT
  - Action 3.2.1.1: Coordinate information exchanges and foster transparency in acquisition and evaluation activities in order to build DoD and interagency communities of interest. (Role: Lead — AED)
    Output: List of engagement events and venues to disseminate JIEDDO R&D priorities to communities of interest (e.g., industry, academia, professional associations).
  - Action 3.2.1.2: Lead or facilitate national and international C-IED working groups that support research and technology maturation in order to build international communities of interest. (Role: Lead — TDD)
    Output: List of engagement events and venues to disseminate JIEDDO R&D priorities to international communities of interest (e.g., industry, academia, professional associations).
  - Action 3.2.1.3: Lead, organize, and facilitate outreach events to communicate future needs and build awareness of technological advancements in order to access innovative S&T and R&D approaches to the C-IED fight. (Role: Lead — Integration Operations Division [IOD])
    Output: A viable and effective “finding network” consisting of informed and motivated communities of interest addressing IED threats through cutting-edge technologies.

- Task 3.2.2: Analyze capability gaps to determine current and emerging technology requirements.
Discussion: Conduct research and analysis to effectively identify and develop technologies and concepts to counter known, newly deployed and emerging IED threats.

Outcome: 10% of submitted proposals from each outreach event are accepted.
Outcome: 10% of accepted proposals become proven C-IED capabilities.

Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDRAT

- Action 3.2.2.4: Lead prioritization efforts across the DoD S&T enterprise in order to synchronize efforts to maximize C-IED investments and solutions. (Role: Lead — TDD)
  Output: List of programs and efforts across DoD and the national labs that ensure that JIEDDO R&D priorities are met.

- Action 3.2.2.3: Lead the processes for solicitation and evaluation of proposals for new C-IED capabilities development in order to quickly find solutions to CCDR C-IED priorities. (Role: Lead — TDD)
  Output: Disposition of proposals are determined within 12 months. Ten percent of all companies participating in each outreach event submit a proposal.

• Task 3.2.3: Institutionalize and execute processes that identify, define, and forecast threats to support targeted development of C-IED capabilities in order to effectively and efficiently mitigate IED-related threats.

Discussion: The threat gap and rapid development cross-walk must be a re-occurring cyclic event at the national level so that the acquisition community can establish and maintain a realistic and effective level of responsiveness to C-IED requirements.

Outcome: 90% of dispositions are determined within 12 months.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDRAT

- Action 3.2.3.1: Develop, implement, and resource the C-IED infrastructure in order to rapidly identify, develop, and mature future C-IED capabilities. (Role: Lead — TRID, TDD)
  Output: Disposition or proposals are determined within 12 months. Ten percent of submitted proposals from the outreach event are accepted. Ten percent of accepted proposals become proven C-IED capabilities.

• Task 3.2.4: Analyze capability gaps in order to determine emerging C-IED solutions.
Discussion: JIEDDO must be pro-active in our capability gap and threat assessment in order to stay head of the C-IED requirements, solution development, or even in some cases the procurement curve that may delay our ability to deliver C-IED solutions to theater in less than 36 months.

Outcome: 90% of dispositions are determined within 12 months.

Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDRAT

- Action 3.2.4.1: Maintain awareness and visibility of developing and known C-IED capabilities within DoD in order to prevent duplication and quickly provide solutions to CCDR requirements. (Role: Lead — TRID, AED)
  Output: CIED database that will facilitate the identification of CIED development programs across DoD and prevent the redundancy of efforts, resulting in costs savings and accelerating deployment of CIED solutions to the warfighter.

- Action 3.2.4.2: Coordinate with greater C-IED communities of interest with regard to threats in order to leverage and share solutions to IED users. (Role: Lead — Capabilities Acquisition Center (CAC), all)
  Output: Viable and effective finding network consisting of informed and motivated communities of interest addressing IED threats through cutting-edge technologies.

- Objective 3.3: Conduct continuous evaluation of C-IED capabilities based on identified requirements, goals, and objectives to determine effectiveness.
  Schedule, as the key to rapid acquisition, is in natural conflict with the requirement to conduct testing (and its associated time period). Although the first function to be eliminated to save time is testing, the requirement for evaluation data remains. Continuous evaluation (CE) resolves the issue of insufficient time to conduct testing. CE accepts all forms of test data; i.e., contractor, experimental, development, early user test, etc., that can be used to viably evaluate the technical performance of an initiative in an operational environment.
  Objective MOE: 90% of initiatives in the solution domain are in compliance regarding cost, schedule, and performance, and 100% of breached initiatives are identified resulting in a corrective action/mitigation plan. (DDRR Support)
  Objective MOP: Percentage of initiative’s JAM scores above benchmark.
  Objective MOP: Percentage of JAM areas of concern with active corrective measures older than 30, 60, and 90 days.

- Task 3.3.1: Execute a continuous evaluation process spanning all C-IED initiatives to ensure effective and comprehensive solutions to warfighter needs.
Discussion: Develop and oversee the execution of Initiative Evaluation Plans (IEP). Coordinate test resources and support on behalf of JIEDDO initiatives. This will also mean rapid testing and evaluation.

Outcome: 90% of initiatives in the solution domain are in compliance regarding cost, schedule, and performance.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead – DDRAT

- Action 3.3.1.1: Integrate a robust C-IED capabilities assessment process into the acquisition strategy and deployment plans for all initiatives, to include system of systems and family of systems in order to enable time decisions related to the cost, schedule and performance of C-IED initiatives.
  (Role: Lead — AED, TRID, TDD)

  Output: JIEDD Assessment Methodology (JAM) provides assessment of the “health” of an initiative and determination of risk. This ensures that the right information is gathered in support of the right decision being made at the right time to obtain the most effective performance as rapidly as practical. Additionally, JAM data provides the information for robust systemic analysis – continuous improvement of the rapid acquisition process and further reduction in the time required to develop a solution.

- Action 3.3.1.2: Develop, implement, and resource the infrastructure in order to evaluate the technical performance and operational effectiveness of C-IED capabilities. (Role: Lead — AED)

  Output: JAM provides information to assist in the training and improvement of the of the JIEDDO acquisition workforce – facilitating improvement to the management oversight of initiatives. Additionally, JAM data provides the information for robust systemic analysis – continuous improvement of the rapid acquisition process and further reduction in the time required to develop a solution.

- Objective 3.4: Underwrite risk by understanding the future threat, rapidly applying resources, and synchronizing DoD efforts.

  Key to rapid acquisition is schedule as the most important independent variable. In order to meet the warfighter’s performance requirements in the shortest time possible, risk must be accepted with multiple technology developments in parallel paths against a capability gap. Risks in an initiative must be effectively managed and mitigated from a relatively high level at the beginning of the initiative’s lifecycle to a low-level before the transition to a Service.

  Objective MOE: Develop Risk Mitigation strategy for each Operational Needs area
  Objective MOP: 100% of internal parallel efforts are planned for risk mitigation.
Objective MOP: 100% of external parallel efforts are planned for risk mitigation. (J-5 Lead)

Objective MOP: An acceptable percentage of high risk initiatives successfully mitigated to lower risk within 60 days.

- Task 3.4.1: Execute strategies and technology roadmaps that capitalize on innovative research and continuous product improvement through the investment in multiple technology approaches.
  Discussion: Risks in an initiative are effectively managed and mitigated from a high level at the beginning of the initiative’s lifecycle to a low-level before the transition to a Service.
  Outcome: Risk mitigation plans that ensure risks are identified and mitigated (i.e., risk burn-down) in order to meet the schedule of less than 24 months of a solution deployed to theater.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves national capability)
  Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead - DDRAT
    - Action 3.4.1.1: Perform analysis of alternatives (AoA) and capability based assessments in order to identify best of breed among rapidly maturing technologies. (Role: Lead — TDD)
      Outcome: AoA determines top three technologies that should be developed to meet warfighter requirements. Risk plans are developed and followed for each technology development. Initiatives that do not come to fruition in 18-24 months are quickly terminated.
    - Action 3.4.1.2: Assign subject matter experts to designated internal and external working groups, communities of interest, and analytic groups in order to identify the most viable approaches and to synchronize efforts. (Role: Lead — TDD)
      Output: Effective oversight of C-IED initiatives through a well-trained and experienced workforce.
    - Action 3.4.1.3: Develop tenet-level JIEDD System Review (JSR) processes to evaluate planned (parallel efforts) and unplanned redundancies in order to identify and determine the most effective, efficient, and timely C-IED capability. (Role: Lead — TDD, AED)
      Output: JSRs conducted at major milestone events associated with the lifecycle of an initiative. CSP (Cost, Schedule, and Performance) criteria is addressed through the JSR. Failure of the initiative to meet the criteria requires a T3C decision.
o Action 3.4.1.4: Coordinate and synchronize Joint IED testing to leverage previous and/or external-to-JIEDDO test strategies, models, and results in order to rapidly provide capabilities to the CCDRs (user communities).
(Role: Lead- TDD, AED)
Output: Library of IED test protocols and procedures is established and used to standardize test procedures and evaluation criteria. Result is a DoD-wide testing infrastructure using approved protocols facilitating more opportunities for test events and the reduction in schedule and mitigation of risks.

- Objective 3.5: Provide effective management and oversight of JIEDDO contracts.
  Contracting is an essential component of JIEDDO's support to the warfighter to include the LOOs (AtN, TtF, DtD), and infrastructure support. Competitive sourcing and effective management ensures service quality and effective cost management. Oversight of contracting actions will ensure no breaks in support and effects are appropriately funded or terminated as appropriate. Receiving limited procurement authority will enable JIEDDO to selectively prioritize in accordance with mission priorities and pursue the more effective acquisition strategies.

  Objective MOE: 90% of new contracts are awarded within 30 days of submission deadline and 100% of active contracts are in compliance with existing standards and requirements.

- Task 3.5.1: Ensure the timeliness and quality of JIEDDO contracting actions
  Discussion: JIEDDO must develop and manage internal and external JIEDDO contracting policy IAW the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense FAR (DFAR) to support rapid acquisition, program management oversight and transfer of proven capabilities to counter known, newly deployed and emerging IED threats.
  Outcome: Effective execution - 90% of new solicitations and contract actions are completed and/or awarded with minimal work stoppages related to inefficient contact administration or management strategies.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead — DDRAT
  o Action 3.5.1.1: Provide advice and guidance regarding business and technical requirements, establishing clear expectations for all parties. This includes the exercise of options and follow-on requirements in order to enable JIEDDO to provide materiel, non-materiel and service capabilities when and where required.
    (Role: Lead - Contracting)
Output: Performance of this action directly supports the effective execution of the MOP and ensures that 90% of new solicitations and contract actions are completed and/or awarded with minimal work stoppages related to inefficient contact administration or management strategies.

- Action 3.5.1.2: Establish contracting officer's representative (COR) training requirements and assess COR performance regarding enforcing supplier compliance with terms, conditions, and performance commitments, and providing management visibility into execution status in order to provide technical expertise to the KO and enable timely contracting support to CCDR C-IED efforts.
  (Role: Lead- Contracting)
  Output: Performance of this action directly supports the effective execution of the MOP and ensures that 90% of new solicitations and contract actions are completed and/or awarded with minimal work stoppages related to inefficient contact administration or management strategies.
Goal 4: Lead DoD C-IED training and training capability development that supports the Joint Staff’s, Services’ and Combatant Commanders’ efforts to prepare Forces to successfully attack the network and defeat the device in the contemporary and future operating environments.

Time and time again, reports from the field reinforce the thesis that training is critical to countering the IED threat. Whether in Southwest or Southeast Asia, a properly trained force is able to adapt to the changing threat and take the fight to the enemy. It is imperative that JIEDDO lead the effort to identify C-IED training gaps and energetically fill those gaps in support of the Joint Staff’s, Services’ and Combatant Commanders’ objectives.

- Objective 4.1: Develop and execute a synchronized C-IED training plan that supports the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands and, as authorized, partner nations and interagency C-IED training requirements.
  Available training time for any deploying force is at a premium. Training that is not synchronized with the force generation cycle, Service training guidance and priorities, and a unit’s training objectives, MRX schedule and other related training, may result in wasted training time and in the worst case, shortfalls in training that should have been conducted.

Objective MOE: Optimized C-IED capabilities by supporting and enabling current and emerging C-IED training in support of the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and as directed, coalition forces and interagency partners.

- Task 4.1.1: Coordinate/synchronize/conduct pre-deployment C-IED training in support of Service force generation.
  Discussion: Deploying forces have a myriad of pre-deployment training requirements to accomplish and many of these are C-IED related. Because of the relatively short force generation timeline for deploying forces, available training time is at a premium and it is important to coordinate and synchronize C-IED training.
  Outcome: C-IED training is synchronized to support unit training objectives and force generation.
  
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead — DDT
  Partners – DDOI
  o Action 4.1.1.1: Coordinate/synchronize JIEDDO support to Service Combined Arms Training Center (CTC)/ Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) exercises.
C-IED Strategic Plan Annex A

Output: Synchronized C-IED training during unit MRXs that meets the unit’s training objectives.

- Action 4.1.1.2: Coordinate/conduct/support C-IED mobile training teams (MTTs) at home station.
  Output: C-IED MTTs executed upon request by unit and that meets their training objectives.

- Task 4.1.2: Develop/coordinate/conduct as requested Service support to home station training.
  Discussion: As the DoD lead for the development of C-IED training and training capabilities, JIEDDO will assist the Services in developing training capabilities and assessing capabilities resident within the Services.
  Outcome: Support to Services in the development, integration and conduct of home station training and training initiatives conducted on request.
  Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDT.
  o Action 4.1.2.1: Support development of Service standards and metrics to enable the home station trainers to execute mission essential C-IED training.
    Output: Services training establishments are aware of the most current C-IED training standards and metrics.
  o Action 4.1.2.2: Support Service home station training as requested by providing C-IED subject matter experts (SMEs) to advise and assist home station trainers on home station training lane design, lessons learned/TTP integration support, and training assessments.
    Output: Support offered and given to Services to assist in home station training lane design and development, and in the integration of recent lessons learned and TTPs into C-IED training.

- Task 4.1.3: Support Joint and Service C-IED training initiatives as requested.
  Discussion: As the DoD lead for the development of C-IED training and training capabilities, JIEDDO will support the Services and Joint forces in their C-IED training initiatives.
  Outcome: C-IED training support developed for and given to, Joint Forces and Services’ components.
  Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – DDT
    Partners – DDOI, DDRAT, DDRR
o Action 4.1.3.1: A distributed JCOE provides expertise and a venue for training, experimentation, and testing for new Materiel Training Initiatives / Non-Materiel Training Initiatives to address emerging threats in CCDR areas of responsibility (AORs).
   Output: JCOE maintains Service COEs that are manned with C-IED SMEs to provide the necessary expertise and venues for C-IED training, testing and development as requested.

o Action 4.1.3.2: Support Joint and Service doctrine development as requested.
   Output: JCOE provides timely and relevant responses to draft C-IED doctrine from Joint and Service proponents, and input to C-IED training guidance.

• Task 4.1.4: Support C-IED training to partner nations in support of CCDR requirements. *(Replicates task 5.1.1)*

Discussion: The IED threat is global. Similar to current operations in Southwest Asia, the battle space on our flank will, in all likelihood, be occupied by a partner nation. As such, JIEDDO must ensure the CCDR’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans and associated C-IED training for Partner Nations are given full support.

Outcome: Relevant and timely C-IED training to partner nations is delivered in support of Combatant Commanders as requested.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)

Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead – DDT

   Partners – DDRR (JIEDDO CCDR Integrators), DDOI, J-5

o Action 4.1.4.1: Support, as directed, CCDR and Service Component TSC plans as they relate to C-IED training to partner nations.
   Output: Assist CCDRs and Service Components in developing C-IED training support requests.

Output: Deliver timely and relevant C-IED training support to CCDRs and Service Components.

o Action 4.1.4.2: Support, as necessary, C-IED training at JMRC/JMTC
   Output: JCOE ensures JMRC/JMTC is sufficiently manned with SMEs with the necessary C-IED training expertise to support training at those venues.

o Action 4.1.4.3: Support, as requested, NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in implementing the NATO C-IED Action Plan and the development of C-IED doctrine.
   Output: JCOE ensures NATO ACT is provided with the necessary SMEs to support implementing the NATO C-IED Action Plan and the development of C-IED doctrine, as requested.
Action 4.1.4.4: Support NATO C-IED COE and NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Exercises, as requested.
Output: C-IED training SME support provided to the NATO C-IED COE and NATO/PfP exercises, as requested.

Task 4.1.5: Support C-IED training to interagency partners. *(Supports CTUE IP tasks 3.2.5 and 3.2.7)*
Discussion: The IED threat is global and preparations and training must not only focus on DoD, but assist our interagency partners as well. Information exchanges and working groups are critical to preparing for the IED threat, cross-leveling threat information, and collaborating on training capabilities, lessons learned and threat TTPs.
Outcome: Working relationships are developed with interagency partners and information exchanges are conducted on a regular basis.
Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDT
        Partners – DDOI, J5

Action 4.1.5.1: Support Joint Task Force - North (JTF-N) with C-IED information exchanges, C-IED training, and exercise support as directed.
Output: Timely and relevant C-IED SME and training support given to JTF-N.

Action 4.1.5.2: Support interagency working groups as necessary
Output: Timely and relevant C-IED SME support given to interagency working groups.

Task 4.1.6: Manage Joint Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange (JKnIFE) content.
Discussion: Given the global nature of the IED threat, it is important that the DoD, partner nation, and the interagency C-IED training community have access to a repository of current C-IED information for threat analysis and training purposes.
Outcome: A user-friendly, sustainable C-IED training forum, serving the global C-IED community that facilitates relevant C-IED training and assists in closing the gap between training and operational capabilities.
Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDT
        Partners – DDIEM, DDOI
Objective 4.2: Develop C-IED training and training capabilities, and transition those that are enduring to the Services.

Identification of training gaps and developing training and training capabilities are critical to defeating the IED as a weapon of strategic influence. New equipment is not effective out of the box without the requisite training to turn it into a true capability. New enemy TTPs identified should result in corresponding adjustments to our training.

Objective MOE: Identified CIED training gaps are closed by developing and implementing C-IED training solutions that are provided to forces prior to deployment, and C-IED sustainment training is available to forces in theater and at home station. Transition/transfer/termination (T3) plans for material and non material initiatives are developed.

Task 4.2.1: Advise and assist the Services in developing C-IED training capabilities and transition to the Services those that are enduring.

Discussion: As the DoD lead for C-IED, JIEDDO must remain agile enough to support the Services in rapidly identifying training capability gaps and supporting the development of solutions to fill those gaps.

Outcome: JCOE supports the Services in identifying C-IED training capability gaps, develops solutions to fill those training capability gaps, provides support to fill training capability gaps while the Service develops a POM plan, and transitions the capability to the Services upon request of the Service.

Priority: Maintaining (sustains existing capability)

Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead — DDT

Partners — DDRR

Action 4.2.1.1: Support CCDRs and Services in identifying C-IED training gaps and/or future C-IED training requirements.

Output: C-IED training gaps are identified and training capability solutions are developed.

Action 4.2.1.2: Support the Services in developing C-IED training programs to fill C-IED training gaps or future requirements.
Output: JCOE assists Services in identifying C-IED training capability gaps, developing training solutions, and future requirements.

- Action 4.2.1.3: Develop transition plans for C-IED training and support the Services during the transition of C-IED training capabilities.
  Output: Transition plans developed and executed for C-IED training.

- Objective 4.3: Collect, disseminate and incorporate C-IED after action reviews (AARs), lessons learned, and TTPs into C-IED training.

  The enemy is agile in his tactics, IED manufacturing processes, and sourcing of IED components. We must quickly identifying enemy TTPs and relevant lessons learned and rapidly disseminate them to the Service training base to facilitate training updates. This also means identifying trends as they are developing and disseminating this information for trainers and operators – getting ahead of the threat.

  Objective MOE: C-IED Lessons Learned and TTPs are incorporated into JIEDDO training programs and repositories and disseminated to C-IED training community.

- Task 4.3.1: Collect and disseminate to Services, partner nations and interagency partners, IED / C-IED lessons learned, best practices, and TTPs from forces in theater.

  Discussion: Critical to combating the current and future IED threat is understanding current lessons learned from the battlefield, effective friendly TTPs to counter the IED threat, and enemy TTPs.

  Outcome: A robust C-IED lessons learned process is in place which effectively disseminates current and relevant C-IED/IED lessons learned and TTPs from friendly forces to the global C-IED training community.

  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)

  Timeline: Near Term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

  Roles: Lead – DDT

  Partner – DDOI, J3, J5, DDRR, DDRAT

- Action 4.3.1.1: Develop and manage the JIEDDO C-IED lessons learned program, focusing collection efforts at BDE/RCT levels and below.
  Output: C-IED lesson learned program is active and effective as measured by customer feedback.

- Action 4.3.1.2: Conduct C-IED after action reviews (AARs) with BDE/RCTs at time of arrival (TOA) + 90 / + 270 and one post-deployment AAR with BDE/RCTs.
  Output: C-IED AARs are conducted within timeframe specified.

- Action 4.3.1.3: Process and analyze C-IED lessons learned data for relevance and applicability.
Output: C-IED lessons learned data is analyzed and vetted in a timely manner.

- Action 4.3.1.4: Disseminate C-IED lessons learned reports to the training community of interest, including the Services, partner nations and the interagency.  
  Output: C-IED lessons learned from AARs are disseminated to the global C-IED training community within two weeks of the respective AAR.

- Action 4.3.1.5: Conduct monthly video teleconferences with Service trainers (Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM), CTCs) to reinforce priority lessons learned.  
  Output: Monthly VTC conducted with Service trainers.

- Action 4.3.1.6: Liaise with lessons learned institutions (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), NLL, JLLIS) to ensure the dissemination of JIEDDO reports.  
  Output: Monthly meeting with Service’s lessons learned organizations to exchange the latest information.

- Action 4.3.1.7: Manage the content of JKnIFE and disseminate C-IED lessons learned through JKnIFE.  
  Output:  JKnIFE content includes current C-IED lessons learned.
Goal 5: Build a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and international C-IED Community of Action through collaborative planning, information sharing, and cooperative capability development for discrete IED problem sets (e.g., homemade explosives [HME], domestic threat, partner C-IED capability development).

The nature and character of the IED threat requires a multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary approach to the challenge. The complex adaptive adversary will search for seams in the defenses and obstacles to the use of offensive methods in order to gain proximity to high value targets and time to plan and execute sophisticated attacks. To counter this we must create a seamless C-IED community consisting of all actors tasked to counter this enduring threat, but also responsible for the safety of deployed coalition and joint forces, the Homeland of the United States, and the citizenry of allies and coalition partners. Trust is required. We must build lasting relationships, exchange intelligence and information, educate and train to best-practices, and provide access to the most effective technologies.

To achieve this, we will make use of all three lines of operation, as we integrate, coordinate, and cooperate with the interagency, the international community, and as authorized, intergovernmental partners at the federal, state and local levels.

Objective 5.1: Assist Combatant Commanders to develop international and interagency partner C-IED capability and capacity building to mitigate the effects of IEDs.

The Combatant Commanders are assigned by the Unified Command Plan and other national strategic guidance as the responsible agent to safeguard the national interests of the U.S. abroad. These commanders carry out their responsibilities through contingency planning, theater security cooperation planning, exercises, and operations. In addition, interagency partners such as the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, and USAID, are essential contributors to the whole-of-government solution to the IED problem.

Objective MOE: Designated partner nations possess sufficient C-IED Capability (as determined by the Combatant Commander) to conduct effective military operations in an IED threat environment.

Task 5.1.1: Support C-IED training to partner nations in support of Combatant Commander requirements. (Replicates task 4.1.4)

Discussion: The IED threat is global. Similar to current operations in Southwest Asia, the battle space on our flank will, in all likelihood, be occupied by a partner nation.
As such, JIEDDO must ensure the CCDRs’ Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plans and C-IED training for partner nations are given full support.
Outcome: Relevant and timely C-IED training to partner nations is delivered in support of Combatant Commanders as requested.
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves national capability)
Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – DDT.
Partners – J-3 (CCDR Integrators), DDOI, J-5(C).

- Action 5.1.1.1: Support, as directed, CCDR and Service Component TSC plans as they relate to C-IED training to partner nations.
  Output: CCDRs and Service Components in develop accurate C-IED training support requests.
  Output: Timely and relevant C-IED training support to CCDRs and Service Components.

- Action 5.1.1.2: Support as necessary C-IED training at JMRC/JMTC
  Output: JIEDDO’s Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) ensures JMRC/JMTC is sufficiently manned with subject matter experts (SMEs) with the necessary C-IED training expertise to support training at those venues.

- Action 5.1.1.3: Support, as requested, NATO ACT in implementing the NATO C-IED Action Plan and in the development of C-IED doctrine.
  Output: JCOE ensures NATO ACT is provided with the necessary SMEs to support implementing the NATO C-IED Action Plan and the development of C-IED doctrine as requested.

- Action 5.1.1.4: Support NATO C-IED COE and NATO/PfP Exercises as requested.
  Output: C-IED training SME support provided to the NATO C-IED COE and NATO/PfP exercises as requested.

- Task 5.1.2: Establish and maintain relationships with combatant commander staffs.
  Discussion: JIEDDO exists as the DoD lead for C-IED capability development and rapid fielding of material solutions. This function can be leveraged by the assignment of dedicated personnel from JIEDDO to the combatant commands.
  Outcome: Improved C-IED capabilities and training readiness are resident in the Combatant Commands. JIEDDO has improved awareness and understanding of the specific IED challenges of each Combatant Commander.
  Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – J-5(SPPD)
  Partners – J-3 (CCDR Integrators), DDT.
Action 5.1.2.1: Fund and assign personnel with duties to integrate C-IED capabilities into planning, logistics, and execution at the following combatant commands: USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USNORTHCOM, USAFRICOM, USSOCOM, and USSTRATCOM.

Output: Liaison officers from JIEDDO are present and integrated into the CDDR staffs of USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USNORTHCOM, USAFRICOM, USSOCOM, and USSTRATCOM.

Task 5.1.3: Expand bilateral contact with partner nations in support of CCDRs’ Theater Security Cooperation activities.

Discussion: Part of JIEDDO’s mission is to support CCDRs’ requests for C-IED assistance. Campaign Plans and Security Cooperation Plans are specific actions/goals/end states that CCDRs develop and execute to achieve national policy goals for their areas of responsibility. Besides JIEDDO’s direct response to a request to provide a unique C-IED capability, it is JIEDDO’s continuing support to these campaign and Security Cooperation Plans that contributes to long term mission success in providing partner nations with C-IED capacity.

Outcome: Partner nations have resilient C-IED capacity, work collectively to focus on niche areas that can be shared among partners, and are able to operate without the deployment of US forces.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)

Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead – J-5(C)
   Partners – J-3 (CCDR Integrators)

Action 5.1.3.1: Increase visibility of C-IED capabilities & gaps through free flow of information and close communication and coordination with CCDR staffs and Country Teams. Conduct visits, engagements, exchange / liaison, bi-lateral and multilateral working groups, coordination with coalitions/alliances, and aggressively pursue international agreements and foreign disclosure actions.

Output: An accurate status and objective assessment of countries of interest C-IED capability and capacity developed through reports from CCDR staffs, JIEDDO mil-to-mil engagements, and trip reports.

Task 5.1.4: Assist CCDRs with C-IED planning aspects of theater campaign plans, contingency plans, theater security cooperation plans, and exercises.

Discussion: As the lead agent of DoD for C-IED, JIEDDO is aware of the latest materiel and non-materiel solutions to the IED threat. For Combatant Commanders facing an actual or potential IED environment, JIEDDO is a proven resource to
ensure theater planning benefits from the most current C-IED concepts, doctrine, technologies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). In addition, close interaction with the combatant commander’s planning staffs will keep JIEDDO informed of potential or emerging requirements.

Outcome: Combatant Commander, sub-unified commander, and Joint Task Force planning, operations, and exercises are informed by the most current and effective C-IED concepts, doctrine, technologies, and TTP.

Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability).
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead - J-5(SPPD)
Partners – J-3 (CCDR integrators), DDT, JS J-7, CCDRs

- Action 5.1.4.1: Provide C-IED planning assistance, when requested, to the CCDRs’ planning efforts.
Output: Fully formed, comprehensive, and complete C-IED content to applicable Theater Campaign Plans, OPLANS, OPORDERS, Theater Security Cooperation Plans, and exercises.

- Objective 5.2: Seek opportunities to expand the role of international and interagency partners in order to synchronize C-IED capabilities and to share information, intelligence, and technology.

In order to be effective partners in a complex threat environment, allies and coalition forces need to be interoperable with the U.S. military and capable of conducting the widest possible range of military operations. Defeating the IED as a weapon of strategic influence requires forces to have the capability to prevent the adversary from inhibiting the operational or political freedom of action of all participating nations; this strengthens coalition solidarity and demonstrates commitment to the host nation. The best way to achieve this is an open exchange of information and intelligence so all have a common understanding of the operational environment. In addition, recent operations abroad in an IED threat environment have increased the combat effectiveness of the joint force. This experience can benefit interagency and intergovernmental partners who may face an IED threat at home. Sharing information, intelligence and technology with public safety and law enforcement partners will provide for a ready and robust domestic defense.

Objective MOE: Designated partner nations are aware of the latest C-IED threats, trends, information, concepts, doctrine, and systems solutions.

- Task 5.2.1: Participate in international engagement activities to include C-IED seminars, and conferences and conduct bilateral senior leader-to-leader and working level engagements with key members of C-IED organizations.
Discussion: JIEDDO leverages existing relationships with traditional allies and seeks to expand contacts with other nations to share the most effective C-IED solutions. Outcome: C-IED capabilities and training readiness are improved among U.S. allied and coalition partner armed forces.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – J-5(C)
Partners – JIEDDO Strategic Communication Branch

- Action 5.2.1.1: Contacts between JIEDDO and partner nation militaries occur with frequency and result in follow-on collaboration and information sharing.
  Output: Meetings, working groups, conferences, and other fora are established to capitalize on senior and mid-level leader contacts between JIEDDO and allies/coalition militaries. Key leader engagement and trip reports and records will be made available to the C-IED community of interest.

- Task 5.2.2: Establish and maintain relationships with international C-IED organizations. Through formal agreements (MOU/MOAs), frameworks (Terms of Reference), and work plans, JIEDDO and coalition partners establish a deliberate process for collaboration.
  Discussion: Beyond the NATO alliance, international or regional organizations may request or require U.S. C-IED assistance to carry out contingencies, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and foreign internal defense missions. Effective force protection ensures freedom of action. Force safety will prevent erosion of political support. Effective and consistent training in the latest C-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures facilitates interoperability.
  Outcome: Improved C-IED capabilities are shared and training readiness is increased among U.S., allied, and coalition partner armed forces.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – J-5(C)
  Partners – J-3 (CCDR integrators)
  - Action 5.2.2.1: Develop a structured process for in-depth collaboration on all C-IED related issues with allies and coalition partner militaries.
    Output: Improved training, equipment, and information flow exists between JIEDDO and its partners which contribute to superior C-IED capabilities of all nations’ militaries involved. Formal agreements, terms of reference, and work plans are created, staffed, and executed.
• Task 5.2.3: Assist the interagency to develop and maintain a comprehensive inventory of C-IED capabilities and assets including RDT&E related to preventing, detecting, protecting against, and responding to the explosives threat. *(Supported by task 1.1.3, supports CTUE IP task 1.3.1)*

Discussion: Within the interagency community, there is little awareness of existing explosive and C-IED capabilities, assets, training, exercises, analysis programs, authorities, and RDT&E initiatives. By developing and maintaining a comprehensive inventory of current efforts, capabilities, and accessible assets the Counter-IED community can integrate, synergize, and efficiently use high demand resources. Additionally, this inventory will provide a current, comprehensive national capabilities picture which can then be assessed against national priorities. This inventory will assist in the assessment of gaps in RDT&E initiatives thereby driving informed, holistic resource investments to ensure targeted use of resources.

Outcome: National defense, homeland security, and law enforcement planners and decision makers possess a comprehensive inventory of current C-IED capabilities, and available material/ non-material resources.

Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead - DDRR
Partners – DDIEM, J-5(IA), DHS, DOJ, DOE, DOT
  o Action 5.2.3.1: JIEDDO, in support of DHS, and in coordination with our interagency partners, assists in developing and maintaining an annually updated inventory of explosives-related capabilities and assets.

Output: A regularly updated inventory of DoD explosives-related capabilities and assets available to the interagency.

• Task 5.2.4: Assist DOJ to develop an overarching federated IED information sharing architecture within the information sharing environment (ISE) that unites explosive information sharing systems and databases using a single point of access and user authentication. *(Supports CTUE IP task 2.2.3)*

Discussion: Currently, multiple information sharing systems and portals are used to facilitate the flow of IED-related information and secure posting of threat alerts, police reports, and other relevant publications. These systems create confusion by presenting duplicative or confusing information. Additionally, they require multiple passwords and user identities to access each individual system; reducing efficiency and use of the systems.

Outcome: An expanded, functional, and widely used IED Community of Interest (COI) that includes Federal information sharing systems connected within a service-
oriented architecture (SOA), using a single sign-on for user authentication, a standard lexicon, reporting requirements, and data attributes.

Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead - DDIEM

Partners – DDDR (WTI), DDOI, J-5(IA), DOJ, DHS

- Action 5.2.4.1: JIEDDO will share information fusion threat analysis tools, knowledge visualization technologies, and analytical methodologies with interagency and global partners.
  Output: An expanded and functional C-IED COI that includes DoD information for use within U.S. government agencies and global partners.

- Action 5.2.4.2: Explosives information systems adopt the Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) IED Lexicon and corresponding metadata standard.
  Output: IED COI systems and databases adopt the WTI Lexicon and metadata standard developed by DoD for describing explosives incidents and characterizing IED components, consistent and in compliance with the CTISS standards.

• Task 5.2.5: Submit proposal to clarify domestic authorities to allow JIEDDO to readily interact with interagency and intergovernmental partner organizations and agencies. *(Replicates task 5.3.4 and supports CTUE IP tasks 1.2.1 and 3.2.10)*
  Discussion: To achieve a true whole-of-government, all-of-Nation solution to the IED problem set, JIEDDO’s authorities should clearly allow domestic support. C-IED lessons learned in, and capabilities developed for, overseas theaters within all three lines of operation apply to domestic threats. JIEDDO’s ability to interact, share, and coordinate C-IED capabilities with interagency and intergovernmental partner organizations is key to discovering, disrupting, and pursuing threats as well as protecting against and responding to domestic IED attacks. Further, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review directs DoD to “Enhance domestic counter-IED capabilities to better prepare the Department [of Defense] to support civil authorities, seeking to counter potential threats from domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs), DoD will assist civil authorities with counter-IED TTPs and capabilities developed in recent operations.”
  Outcome: As the Department of Defense lead for C-IED, JIEDDO has the unambiguous legal authority to support other federal agencies, including assistance with domestic C-IED capabilities.

  Priority: Enhancing (Significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead - J-5(SPPD)
Partners – J-5(IA), DHS, DOS, DOC, DOT, USNORTHCOM

- Action 5.2.5.1: Continue with existing and clarify JIEDDO authorities as stated in the revision to the JIEDDO charter, DoD Directive 2000.19E, for liaison with interagency and intergovernmental partner organizations, and other federal agencies.
  Output: JIEDDO obtains increased authorities to share C-IED information and capabilities with other federal departments and agencies in response to domestic IED threats.
- Action 5.2.5.2: Participate in senior leader advisory boards and interagency task forces to facilitate comprehensive, whole of government C-IED solutions; enable the broad integration of C-IED initiatives and solutions; and synchronize the combined authorities of U.S. agencies and international partners.
  Output: JIEDDO provides unique C-IED knowledge and capability to interagency and intergovernmental partners.

- Task 5.2.6: Establish and maintain relationships with relevant non-government organizations (NGOs), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), National Laboratories, industry, and academia.
  Discussion: JIEDDO exists as the DoD lead for C-IED strategy, capability development, and rapid fielding of material solutions. New and innovative ideas frequently come from those not directly connected to the military, the government, or the defense industry. JIEDDO can exploit this creative thinking by establishing close professional relationships and information sharing with key laboratory, academic institutions, NGOs, etc.
  Outcome: C-IED initiatives benefit from exposure to audiences across a wide spectrum of backgrounds.
  Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead – J-5(IA)
  Partners – DDRR, JIEDDO Science Advisor, JIEDDO STRATCOM
- Action 5.2.6.1: Assign personnel with duties to interact with select NGOs, FFRDCs, National Laboratories, academia, and industry.
  Output: These institutions are solicited for ideas and contributions to IED challenges. The organizations analyze selected solutions to IED problem sets and provide feedback and/or solution ideas.

- Task 5.2.7: Assist DHS to incorporate prevention related exercises regarding IED attacks into the National Exercise Program. (Supports CTUE IP task 2.2.6)
Discussion: Outside of a real world incident, conducting exercises is the most effective method through which the homeland security community can accurately assess its capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from an attack. These exercises are important for identifying gaps and improving terrorism prevention plans.

Outcome: IED-related scenarios and objectives that include the full range of missions are incorporated into national level exercises in order to evaluate and improve capabilities to prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to IED attacks.

Priority: Beneficial (enhances existing capability)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead - J-5(IA)
Partners – DDT, DHS, DOJ

Action 5.2.7.1: Coordinate with the interagency DHS National Exercise Program (NEP) Executive Steering Committee to introduce IED related exercise scenarios and objectives into the NEP 5-year schedule as appropriate.
Output: The 5-year NEP schedule includes IED exercises.

- Objective 5.3: As authorized, assist the C-IED efforts of other federal agencies – as part of the whole-of-government approach – in order to provide for defense support of civil authorities, and to augment and enhance other federal agencies’ C-IED capabilities to protect U.S. citizens and national infrastructure.

JIEDDO is directed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review to provide “… faster, more flexible consequence management response forces” in the event of a high-yield explosive incident. And to “Enhance domestic counter-IED capabilities to better prepare the Department [of Defense] to support civil authorities, seeking to counter potential threats from domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs), DoD will assist civil authorities with counter-IED TTPs and capabilities developed in recent operations.”

Objective MOE: National C-IED responsible organizations are informed of and benefit from DoD C-IED and counter network capabilities and knowledge.

- Task 5.3.1: As authorized, assist other federal agencies to enhance awareness and outreach programs and to inform private sector wholesale distributors and retailers of precursor chemicals whose products may be used to manufacture explosives. (Supports CTUE IP task 2.3.2)

Discussion: Retailers who sell precursor chemicals and potential IED components should be informed about the possible misuse of those items for criminal and terrorist activities. While there are currently multiple initiatives that inform the private sector of the availability of chemicals and precursor materials used to manufacture HME and IED components, these programs require increased coordination.
Outcome: Increased participation by private sector suppliers of precursor chemicals in awareness and outreach programs.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves national capability)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – JIEDDO STRATCOM
Partners – DDOI, J-5(IA), DHS, DOJ

- Action 5.3.1.1: As authorized, JIEDDO will assist DHS and DOJ to improve private sector outreach materials related to HME precursors, and suspicious behavior to identify gaps and messaging opportunities.
Output: Addition of non-U.S. precursor materials information to DHS and DOJ for inclusion in outreach materials

- Task 5.3.2: As authorized, assist the Department of Homeland Security to develop a national IED awareness and public vigilance campaign. (Supports CTUE IP task 2.3.3)
Discussion: The public is not sufficiently engaged in IED prevention activities, nor are they adequately informed about the international or domestic IED threat. An informed public and private sector strengthens our defense by recognizing suspicious activity related to a potential IED attack. The public and private sector must be knowledgeable of indicators and warnings of terrorism and must be familiar with and have access to official mechanisms for reporting suspicious behavior, such as contact information for local law enforcement or Joint Terrorism Task Forces. In addition, awareness campaigns must inform the public about its vital role in preventing terrorist attacks by emphasizing everyday awareness and vigilance.
Outcome: The U.S. public clearly understands the IED threat and the important role the average citizen has in preparing for, identifying, reporting, and protecting against an IED incident.
Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves national capability)
Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – JIEDDO STRATCOM
Partners – J-5(IA)

- Action 5.3.2.1: JIEDDO will support, as authorized, interagency partners to expand ongoing programs to inform the public about explosives, IED threats, and official venues available for the public to report suspicious activity.
Output: An expanded public awareness campaign that coordinates ongoing efforts, to include public messaging and reporting information.
Task 5.3.3: Collect and disseminate to the Joint Force, the Services, the interagency, and international partners C-IED lessons learned, best practices, and TTPs from forces in theater. (*Replicates task 4.3.1 and supports CTUE IP task 2.2.4*)

Discussion: Understanding and incorporating current lessons learned from the battlefield are essential to effectively combat the current and future IED threat.

Outcome: A robust C-IED lessons learned process is in place which effectively harvests and disseminates current and relevant C-IED lessons learned and TTPs from friendly forces to the global C-IED training community.

Priority: Enhancing (significantly improves existing capability)

Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead – DDT

Partner – DDOI, J3, J5(SPPD), DDRR, DDRAT

- Action 5.3.3.1: Develop and manage the JIEDDO C-IED lessons learned program, focusing collection efforts at BDE/RCT levels and below.
  Output: C-IED lesson learned program is active and effective as measured by customer feedback.

- Action 5.3.3.2: Conduct C-IED AARs with BDE/RCTs at TOA + 90 / + 270 and one post-deployment AAR with BDE/RCTs.
  Output: C-IED AARs are conducted within timeframe specified.

- Action 5.3.3.3: Process and analyze C-IED lessons learned data for relevance applicability
  Output: C-IED lessons learned data is analyzed and vetted in a timely manner.

- Action 5.3.3.4: Disseminate to the C-IED training community of interest, including the Services, partner nations and the interagency, C-IED lessons learned reports.
  Output: C-IED Lessons Learned from AARs disseminated to the global C-IED training community within two weeks of the respective AAR.

- Action 5.3.3.5: Conduct monthly VTCs with Service Trainers (FORSCOM, TECOM, CTCs) to reinforce priority lessons learned.
  Output: Monthly VTCs conducted with Service trainers.

- Action 5.3.3.6: Liaise with lessons learned institutions (CALL, MCCLL, NLL, JLLIS) to ensure the dissemination of reports.
  Output: Monthly meeting with Service lesson learned organizations to exchange information.

- Action 5.3.3.7: Manage the content of JKnIFE and disseminate lessons learned through JKnIFE.
  Output: JKnIFE content includes current C-IED lessons learned information taken from AARs.
• Task 5.3.4: Submit proposal to clarify domestic authorities to allow JIEDDO to readily interact with interagency and intergovernmental partner organizations and agencies. *(Replicates task 5.2.5)*

Discussion: To achieve a true whole-of-government, all-of-nation solution to the IED problem set, JIEDDO’s authorities should clearly allow domestic support. C-IED lessons learned in, and capabilities developed for, overseas theaters within all three lines of operation apply to domestic threats. JIEDDO’s ability to interact, share, and coordinate C-IED capabilities with interagency and intergovernmental partner organizations is key to discovering, disrupting, and pursuing threats as well as protecting against and responding to domestic IED attacks. Further, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review directs DoD to “Enhance domestic counter-IED capabilities to better prepare the Department [of Defense] to support civil authorities, seeking to counter potential threats from domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs), DoD will assist civil authorities with counter-IED TTPs and capabilities developed in recent operations.”

Outcome: As the Department of Defense lead for C-IED, JIEDDO has the unambiguous legal authority to support other federal agencies, including assistance with domestic C-IED capabilities.

  Priority: Enhancing (Significantly improves existing capability)
  Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)
  Roles: Lead - J-5(SPPD)

  Partners – J-5(IA), DHS, DOS, DOC, DOT, USNORTHCOM

  o Action 5.3.4.1: Continue with existing and clarify JIEDDO authorities as stated in the revision to the JIEDDO charter, DoD Directive 2000.19E, for liaison with interagency and intergovernmental partner organizations, and other federal agencies.

  Output: JIEDDO obtains increased authorities to share C-IED information and capabilities with other federal departments and agencies in response to domestic IED threats.

  o Action 5.3.4.2: Participate in senior leader advisory boards and interagency task forces to facilitate comprehensive, whole of government C-IED solutions; enable the broad integration of C-IED initiatives and solutions; and synchronize the combined authorities of U.S. agencies and international partners.

  Output: JIEDDO provides unique C-IED knowledge and capability to interagency and intergovernmental partners.

• Task 5.3.5: Coordinate with the Department of Justice, specifically the FBI as lead agency, and the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the implementation
Discussion: The use of IED’s as the terrorist weapon of choice has increased exponentially over the past decade. The flow of IED information across the internet has made the threat a global phenomenon no longer confined to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent attacks using IEDs in the United States, although unsuccessful, demonstrate that a real danger exists to the homeland. Thus, a whole-of-government approach is required to prevent IED attacks and limit their consequences.

Outcome: JIEDDO establishes close working relationships throughout the interagency with a global focus to achieve a united and coordinated approach to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.

Priority: Enhancing (Significantly improves existing capability)

Timeline: Near term (less than one year to achieve task outcome)

Roles: Lead - J-5(IAD)

Partners – DDOI

- Action 5.3.5.1: JIEDDO participates as an active member of the Joint Program Office, the National Explosives Task Force (NETF), and other interagency organizations dedicated to C-IED actions.
  
  Output: JIEDDO provides unique C-IED knowledge and capability to interagency partners.

- Action 5.3.5.2: JIEDDO places liaison officers (LNOs) at major interagency offices.
  
  Output: JIEDDO provides unique C-IED knowledge and capability to interagency partners.

- Task 5.3.6: As directed and authorized, assist other federal agencies to expand the national systems approach for explosive chemical background and precursor chemical detection or screening. (Supports CTUE IP task 2.3.1)

Discussion: Current technologies employed to protect high-risk facilities can be enhanced to improve the detection of homemade explosives (HME). This should include the ability to identify the properties of commonly available precursor materials and hazardous materials used to manufacture these explosives. As advanced or improved detection technologies are proven effective they must then be integrated into a flexible and expanding national architecture.

Outcome: Enhanced screening and detection technologies, methodologies and systems that meet current and emerging threats, including HME and liquid explosives.
Priority: Critical (fills key gap)
Timeline: Long term (between three and five years to achieve task outcome)
Roles: Lead – J-5(IA)
  Partners – DDRR, DDOI, DOJ, DHS

- Action 5.3.6.1: JIEDDO will assist DOJ, DHS, and select Intelligence Community and other Federal, State, local, and industry partners to assess available reference libraries of explosives. The reference library will include standards for collection, sampling, and storage procedures.
  Output: An assessment of available explosives reference materials in the possession of Federal agencies and an updated process for collecting and storing samples, standardizing production methods, and retrieving data or samples from the libraries of materials for intelligence, investigation, forensics, research, or training purposes.

- Action 5.3.6.2: JIEDDO will assist DHS and DOJ to review options for limiting the accessibility of commonly used chemical precursor materials.
  Output: An assessment of the adequacy of existing programs that seek to increase the difficulty of acquisition of identified chemical explosives precursors.

- Task 5.3.7: As authorized, provide C-IED support to interagency partners and other federal agencies to contribute unique expertise to a whole-of-government C-IED capability. (Supports CTUE IP in its entirety)
  Discussion: The Homeland Security Presidential Directive-19 (HSPD-19 Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States) and implementing instructions direct a whole-of-government approach that coordinates federal, state, and local government efforts to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive attacks.” DoD’s demonstrated C-IED capabilities, experience abroad, and international working relationships can have significant impact upon the domestic C-IED effort.
  Information exchanges and working groups are essential to prepare for the IED threat through cross-leveling threat information, and collaborating on training capabilities, lessons learned and threat TTPs.
  Outcome: DoD C-IED expertise and support is provided to the interagency and other federal agencies to fulfill requirements of HSPD-19 (or superseding directives’) implementation plans.
  Priority: Enhancing (significantly approves existing capability)
  Timeline: Medium term (between one and three years to achieve task outcome)
  Partners – DDOI, DDT.
Action 5.3.7.1: As authorized, support interagency partners, other federal agencies and responsible DoD organizations by providing C-IED subject matter expertise to accomplish selected tasks of the HSPD-19 *Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States Implementation Plan* (or superseding directives).

Output: Timely and relevant DoD C-IED support to the HSPD-19 *Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States Implementation Plan* (or superseding directives).
# GLOSSARY

**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after action review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACES</td>
<td>Army Adaptive C-IED/EOD Solutions</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>NATO Allied Command Transformation</td>
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<td>AED</td>
<td>Acquisition Evaluation Division (see DDRAT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMN</td>
<td>Afghanistan Mission Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>AoA</td>
<td>analysis of alternatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARDEC</td>
<td>Army Armament, Research, Development Center</td>
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<td>AtN</td>
<td>attack the network (see LOO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
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<td>BICES</td>
<td>Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System</td>
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<td>CAC</td>
<td>Capabilities Acquisition Center (see DDRAT)</td>
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<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>continuous evaluation</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>center of excellence</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>community of interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIC</td>
<td>C-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center (see DDOI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>contracting officer representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPFF</td>
<td>cost plus fixed fee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRV</td>
<td>capability requirement validation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>cost, schedule, performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>CTSE</td>
<td>C-IED technical support element</td>
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<td>CTTSO</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office</td>
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<td>CTUE IP</td>
<td>Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the U.S. - Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARC</td>
<td>Data Analysis Research and Collaboration (see DDRAT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCR</td>
<td>document change request</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDIEM</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Information Enterprise Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDOI</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Operations/Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRAT</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Rapid Acquisition and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDDRR</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Resources and Requirements</td>
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<td>DDT</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAR</td>
<td>Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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### C-IED Strategic Plan Annex A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DI2E</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP0</td>
<td>decision point zero</td>
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<tr>
<td>DtD</td>
<td>defeat the device (see LOO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Federal Acquisition Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>firm fixed price</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFRDC</td>
<td>Federally Funded Research and Development Centers</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEP</td>
<td>Global Enterprise Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>HME</td>
<td>homemade explosives</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>interagency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAR</td>
<td>input analysis report</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>intelligence community</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IEP</td>
<td>initiative evaluation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJ(STO)</td>
<td>Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations</td>
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<td>IOD</td>
<td>Integration Operations Division (see DDRAT)</td>
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<td>IPL</td>
<td>integrated priority list</td>
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<td>IPT</td>
<td>integrated process team</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>JIEDDO Assessment Methodology</td>
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<td>JCAAMP</td>
<td>JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCAST</td>
<td>JIEDDO COIC Analytical Support Team (see COIC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCDP</td>
<td>JIEDDO Capabilities Development Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCOE</td>
<td>Joint Center of Excellence (see DDT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEMS</td>
<td>JIEDDO Enterprise Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JET</td>
<td>Joint Expeditionary Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIEDAC</td>
<td>Joint IED Analysis Centre (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIEDDF</td>
<td>Joint IED Defeat Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIEDDO</td>
<td>Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>JKlIFE</td>
<td>Joint Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLLIS</td>
<td>Joint Lessons Learned Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JORAB</td>
<td>JIEDDO Operational Requirements Assessment Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMRC</td>
<td>Joint Multinational Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMTC</td>
<td>Joint Multinational Training Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPMO</td>
<td>Joint Program Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPP</td>
<td>JIEDDO Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>Joint IED Defeat System Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-N</td>
<td>Joint Task Force - North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTOC</td>
<td>JIEDDO Technology Outreach Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOO</td>
<td>line(s) of operation (see AtN, DtD, and TtF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTOV</td>
<td>latest time of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCCLL</td>
<td>Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Mission Integration Division (see COIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness (outcome)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance (output)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRX</td>
<td>mission rehearsal exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Mission Support Division (see DDRAT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>mobile training team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>National Exercise Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>NETF</td>
<td>National Explosives Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-government organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NID</td>
<td>Net-Centric Integration Division (see DDRAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLAN</td>
<td>non-classified local area network (NIPRNet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLL</td>
<td>Navy Lessons Learned Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPS</td>
<td>Operations Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORSA</td>
<td>operations research and systems analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWF</td>
<td>Ozone Widget Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>P3I</td>
<td>pre-planned product improvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>program of instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objectives Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>regimental combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>research, development, testing, and evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Rapid Equipping Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>special access program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAN</td>
<td>secret local area network (SIPRNet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPPD</td>
<td>JIEDDO J-5 strategy, plans, policy, and doctrine branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>JIEDDO Strategic Communications Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;M</td>
<td>time and materials</td>
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<tr>
<td>T3C</td>
<td>transition, transfer, terminate, or continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDD</td>
<td>Technology Development Division (see DDRAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECOM</td>
<td>Marine Corps Training and Education Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TID</td>
<td>Training Integration Division (see COIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLAN</td>
<td>top secret local area network (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System [JWICS])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>time of arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRID</td>
<td>Technology Requirements Integration Division (see DDRAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRL</td>
<td>technology readiness level</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSE</td>
<td>training support element (see DDT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSO Cap</td>
<td>Theater Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TtF</td>
<td>train the force (see LOO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Northern Command</td>
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<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTI</td>
<td>Weapons Technical Intelligence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Providing rapid and effective C-IED systems and solutions is a DoD core competency. The goal of the C-IED development and acquisition processes is to provide freedom of action to Joint Forces when they operate in an IED threat environment. To ensure rapid response and effective actions, JIEDDO will streamline annual planning, capability development, acquisition management, and assessment. Integration of these processes (the “means” of the strategic plan) involves every level of the organization and is essential to the rapid identification of C-IED capability gaps based on current and future threats, the assessment of capabilities under development and those already fielded, and the determination of the most effective future investment of resources.

The JIEDDO Planning Process (JPP) incorporates current and future threat analyses, overmatch and gap analyses, C-IED requirements identification and validation, and budget estimation. This annual planning effort includes review of DoD and Joint Staff strategic planning and policy guidance and Combatant Commander requirements. An annual IED global threat assessment together with continuous reviews of the Combatant Commanders’ C-IED requirements and assessments of the effectiveness of existing C-IED capabilities produce the strategic context that informs the process of determining capability requirements and gaps.

Outputs from annual planning are approved budget requests, a two year execution plan, and an annual report. The execution plan provides a snapshot at the beginning of the fiscal year of the initial investment decisions resulting from the JPP and allocation of an approved budget.
request. It also forecasts anticipated requirements and C-IED spending priorities for the following fiscal year.

The JIEDDO Capabilities Development Process (JCDP) informs investment decisions that provide capabilities required to fulfill operational needs. The JCDP identifies unmet Combatant Commanders’ needs and captures other undefined or incomplete C-IED shortfalls. It then determines which C-IED capabilities should be developed to counter both current and future threats. Outputs from the JCDP are used in conjunction with program health assessments and operational assessments conducted within the JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) to recommend investment priorities for the current and coming fiscal years, and to develop LOO-based requirements for annual budget requests and DoD’s Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

The rapid acquisition process, JCAAMP, finds, funds, develops and procures materiel and non-materiel C-IED capabilities to meet the Combatant Commanders’ priority requirements, and resolves the capability gaps identified in the requirements process. C-IED initiatives developed in the JCAAMP are assessed at milestone decision points for their effectiveness against IED threats, for risks to their schedule of development or fielding, and for their costs. An embedded Transition, Transfer, Terminate or Continue (T3C) decision provides sustained C-IED capacity to the Joint Force. This involves assessment and coordinated transition or transfer of systems, initiatives, or processes to a Service or agency within 24 months from their initiation, or the decision to continue an initiative if it has not matured in development but demonstrates high C-IED value. Assessment processes will enable decisions in the JCAAMP to terminate initiatives that underperform or become obsolete.

Formal and integrated assessment procedures reinforce the JPP, JCDP, and JCAAMP to ensure quality control, outcomes, and efficiencies. An external assessment is warfighter oriented and focuses on systems performance and effectiveness on the battlefield. The JIEDDO Assessment Methodology (JAM) allows internal and external stakeholders to monitor initiatives through the JCAAMP process. This enables JIEDDO to identify programmatic areas (e.g., technical process, resource and schedule, etc.) that require corrective action and to recognize and mitigate risk earlier in an initiatives’ lifecycle (e.g., terminate an initiative due to lack of schedule feasibility). An additional manager’s internal control program maintains effectiveness and efficiencies within the three major JIEDDO processes.

To rapidly determine requirements and provide solutions, these core processes must be tightly integrated and synchronized. The end results are C-IED capabilities that meet the Combatant Commanders’ requirements and enable the defeat of the IED as a weapon of strategic influence.
JIEDDO Planning Process (JPP)

The JIEDDO Planning Process (JPP) integrates and synchronizes JIEDDO’s C-IED capability development process (JCDP) and is informed by C-IED effectiveness assessments, and JIEDDF budget development and execution. It supports the goals and objectives of the C-IED Strategic Plan, the approved Action Plan, and prioritizes JIEDDO’s budget requirements to support the Director’s areas of strategic focus. The JIEDDO Execution Plan is published during the 4th Quarter of each fiscal year (FY). It provides JIEDDO with the Director’s guidance for execution, the Deputy Directorates’ major tasks, and approved initial spending priorities for C-IED investments during the next two FYs. Investment priorities contained in the Execution Plan reflect the C-IED capability requirements approved or revalidated through the JCDP, and the fiscal environment anticipated during the next two FYs. The plan identifies JIEDDO C-IED initiatives intended to transition or transfer to receiving Services and Agencies, or to be continued or terminated during the next two FYs. Finally, the Execution Plan provides the Director’s future planning guidance with which JIEDDO develops estimates for future budget submissions.

The JPP is a continuous process designed to rapidly respond to changes in the IED threat, the CCDRs’ immediate operational requirements, changes in the defense budget environment, and national strategic direction to institutionalize C-IED through a whole-of-government approach. The Execution Plan is a product of the JPP, and is reviewed, revised and republished annually for the following two FYs. Changes to the Execution Plan may be required by the Director periodically throughout the year of execution.

JIEDDO publishes a classified and unclassified annual report each fiscal year, providing a post-execution account of JIEDDO’s significant efforts.

JPP Roles and Responsibilities.

1. J5. The J5 serves as the staff proponent for the JPP, provides a review of current defense strategy and policy guidance relative to C-IED, and with the input of the Deputy Directorates, develops JIEDDO’s Execution Plan in accordance with the Director’s guidance and resource priorities.

2. Deputy Director of Operations/Intelligence (DDOI). The DDOI (C-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center [COIC]) provides and maintains the global IED threat assessment with particular emphasis on the current threat in active theaters of operation. The DDOI (COIC) develops preliminary annual funding requirements for developing Attack the Network C-IED initiatives, and sustainment of training and analytical support to CCDRs. The DDOI (COIC) conducts assessments of funded C-IED AtN solutions and support activities.

3. Deputy Director of Resources and Requirements (DDRR). The DDRR’s Capabilities Integration Division conducts the JCDP and together with the Requirements and Capacity Division identifies, validates, and prioritizes threat-based C-IED capability requirements for resourcing in JIEDDO’s annual budget. The DDRR (via J1-4) develops JIEDDO Staff and
Infrastructure requirements for annual budget submissions. The DDRR (J8) develops JIEDDO’s budget for the FY and budget estimate submission (BES) for the Budget Year (BY).

4. Deputy Director of Rapid Acquisition and Technology (DDRAT). The DDRAT (Capabilities Acquisition Center [CAC]) develops preliminary annual funding requirements for rapid acquisition DtD initiatives and RDT&E efforts. The DDRAT (CAC) conducts program health assessments for funded C-IED DtD initiatives and RDT&E efforts.

5. Deputy Director of Training (DDT). The DDT (Joint Center of Excellence [JCOE]) develops preliminary annual funding requirements for rapid development of C-IED training solutions. The DDT (JCOE) conducts assessments of funded C-IED training solutions.

6. Division Chiefs. Division Chiefs provide guidance and direction to their action officers for development of assigned content for the Execution Plan, and monitor Plan development milestones and suspenses as published in the approved Work Plan.

7. Division Action Officers. Designated Division Action Officers (AOs) are responsible for developing and drafting their assigned sections of the Execution Plan. They represent their Directorates at review sessions, as required.

**JPP and Preparation of the Execution Plan.** Annual development of the Execution Plan is an integral part of the JPP and the development of JIEDDO’s budgets. The Execution Plan addresses capability investment requirements and priorities for the coming FY and projected requirements to be addressed in the BES. The following table includes the nominal suspenses and milestones for JPP activities and products attendant to Execution Plan development. Specific guidance, milestones and suspenses for Execution Plan development are published in the Work Plan by the J5 during July of each FY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspense Timeframe</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov - Dec</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>Defense Strategy and Policy Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J5, DDOI, DDRAT, DDT</td>
<td>C-IED Strategic Plan; Action Plans Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DDOI, DDRR</td>
<td>Threat Assessments: Global, Theater and Future Threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>C-IED Enduring Capabilities Review &amp; Revalidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb - May</td>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Identify and Prioritize C-IED Capability Gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J9</td>
<td>C-IED Effectiveness Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun - Aug</td>
<td>DDOI, DDRAT, DDT, DDRR</td>
<td>Preliminary LOO budget requirements to J8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>LOO Budget Controls issued</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## C-IED Strategic Plan Annex B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspense Timeframe</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                    | DDRR, J5 | BOGSAT:  
- Director’s Initial Execution Guidance  
- Review and validate ExPlan outline and task assignments |
|                    | DDOI, DDRAT, DDT | C-IED Strategic Plan Action Plans Review |
|                    | DDOI, DDRAT, DDT, DDRR | Refined FY Requirements submitted to J8 |
|                    | DDRR | Prioritization of FY Requirements |
| Sep                | DDOI, DDRAT, DDT | LOO Spending Requirements for coming FY; estimated requirements for the BY |
|                    | J5 | Staff draft Execution Plan; Submit to Director for approval prior to 1 Oct |
| Oct                | DDRR | JIEDDO begins execution in the new FY |
| Nov                | DSG | Produce draft JIEDDO Annual Report for the FY just completed |
JIEDDO Capabilities Development Process (JCDP)

JIEDDO’s Capabilities Integration Division leads the JIEDDO Capabilities Development Process (JCDP). This unique methodology informs organizational investment decisions, supports JIEDDO strategic planning, develops future C-IED capabilities, and facilitates other JIEDDO processes. Ultimately, the JCDP enables justification and allocation of resources to address IED threats and capability shortfalls (or “gaps”). The JCDP aggregates and aligns multiple, component sub-processes to produce timely analysis and recommendations. The process is flexible enough to execute each of its sub-processes independently of or in parallel with the others. Similarly, multiple instances of the entire JCDP process can be executed simultaneously, each for a different purpose with unrelated outcomes. Its products and process flow are continuously shared and vetted with participants, stakeholders, and decision-makers.

The JCDP outputs include Required Capabilities Lists, Capabilities Development Roadmaps, Future R&D Required Capabilities Lists, Portfolio Review Results, Input Analysis Reports, Working Group Charters, and Requirements Documents (the last, in coordination with JIEDDO’s Requirements & Capacity Division).

JCDP sub-processes products are compatible with other internal and external processes. To facilitate this interaction, the JCDP tailors its inputs to those processes in accordance with their existing business rules; additionally, JCDP incorporates the outputs from those other processes only to the extent the sponsor intends.
JCDP Sub-Processes.

1. Collect Inputs. JIEDDO continuously receives information from various sources that is potentially relevant to the C-IED effort. After review and analysis the JCDP refines this information as “inputs”. Most of these inputs are not active demands or structured requirements, but instead represent particular warfighter needs, technology investment options, or new threat tactics. The JCDP aggregates these inputs and categorizes them as operational, technological, or threat-based. Threat-based inputs then proceed to the Develop Threat Picture sub-process; whereas, operational or technological inputs proceed directly to the Determine Required Capabilities sub-process.

2. Develop Threat Picture. JIEDDOs’ Capabilities Integration Division collaborates with the C-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center (COIC) and J3 to estimate threat capabilities and define the operational environment. Defining the operational environment includes identifying the applicable operational area and its significant characteristics, describing the mission, and determining operational limitations. Estimates of Threat Capabilities include creating or updating threat models and identifying threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential decisive points. The Threat Picture developed in this sub-process informs the Determine Required Capabilities sub-process.

3. Determine Required Capabilities. Required Capabilities are those necessary to bring about a specific C-IED effect. An accurate determination of specific Required Capabilities is critical to a successful JCDP analysis. A complete Required Capabilities statement includes two components — defining an Operational Need and identifying the relevant Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). (The JCA framework is a Joint Staff tool that provides common definitions of military capabilities to facilitate capability integration across the Department of Defense.) In order to determine Required Capabilities, the JCDP first identifies applicable JCAs for integration into the capabilities development process. In the event required C-IED capabilities are not yet resident in the JCAs, this process will describe those required capabilities (using JCA language) for future development. These are called Operational Needs. Multiple Operational Needs yield multiple Required Capabilities, which are compiled in a Required Capabilities List. This list informs the Review Portfolio (& External Sources) sub-process.

4. Review Portfolio (& External Sources). The Required Capabilities List is compared against JIEDDO’s existing C-IED Capabilities Investment Portfolio. The JCDP will also engage External Sources (i.e. C-IED stakeholders and agencies with C-IED missions or missions conducted in an IED threat environment), to identify new capabilities. This sub-process includes collaboration with other JIEDDO Resources and Requirements divisions, the JIEDDO Capabilities Acquisition Center, the COIC, and JIEDDO’s training Joint Center of Excellence as required. It informs the Develop Recommendations sub-process by identifying Available Enablers (C-IED solutions available to US military personnel) and Developing Enablers (C-IED solutions still being developed or otherwise not yet available to US military personnel) which
can provide the Required Capabilities identified by the Required Capabilities List. It also identifies those Required Capabilities for which there are no known enablers.

5. Develop Recommendations. This sub-process produces the JCDP Initial Analysis Report (or IAR). This is the principal means for communicating JCDP findings and recommendations and informs the Validate Recommendations sub-process. Generally, the IAR contains four main parts (with appendices added as necessary): Threat Picture, Required Capabilities, Portfolio Review, and Recommendations. IAR recommendations may include the acquisition or re-purposing of Available Enablers, the continued funding or research of Developing Enablers, and the development or research of New Enablers. The IAR may also recommend chartering a JIEDDO working group to find a solution. (A JCDP IAR recommendation to charter a working group is reserved for priority problems proven intractable to less resource-intensive analysis.)

6. Validate Recommendations. In accordance with the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP), the JIEDDO Operational Requirement Assessment Board (JORAB) typically validates the decisions of the Deputy Director for Resources and Requirements. IAR recommendations may be validated in the same manner. (The JIEDDO Director will approve a validated IAR recommendation to charter a working group.)

7. Develop & Refine Requirements Documents. In coordination with the Rapid Acquisition and Technology Directorate, Resources and Requirements refines validated requirements, both structured (e.g. Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements [JUONS]) and unstructured (e.g. IAR recommendations), prior to passing to the Solutions Domain for capabilities enabler development and funding.
JIEDDO Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)

The JIEDD Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) is JIEDDO’s process to respond to urgent warfighter needs, to aggressively seek, acquire, and assess potential materiel, non-materiel, and training solutions to these needs through extensive finding networks, and to place developmental C-IED initiatives in the hands of warfighters for evaluation. JCAAMP also enables a transition or transfer of proven C-IED capabilities to one or more Services or agencies, provides guidance on the disposition of those initiatives recommended for termination, and allows for spiral improvement of capabilities.

JCAAMP Roles and Responsibilities.

1. The Director (JIEDDO). The Director (JIEDDO) articulates JIEDDO strategic plans and guidance, establishes formal governance for JCAAMP, monitors the implementation of JCAAMP, and approves initiatives with total lifecycle cost up to $25 million.

2. The Vice Director (JIEDDO). The Vice Director (JIEDDO) acts for the Director in his/her absence, chairs the JIEDD Integrated Process Team (JIPT), and accepts and executes delegated authorities.

3. Deputy Director of Resources and Requirements (DDRR). The DDRR has responsibility for the Capability Requirements Validation Domain and serves as the lead to coordinate and assess Service and Agency needs to prioritize and validate C-IED operational and technology gaps and requirements. The DDRR also executes Transition and Transfer in the Integration Domain.

4. Deputy Director of Rapid Acquisition and Technology (DDRAT). The DDRAT is the proponent for JCAAMP and serves as the lead for the Solution Domain and, jointly with the DDRR, the Integration Domain. The DDRA&T provides oversight of JCAAMP, is responsible for its management and execution. The DDRA&T also serves as the Director’s representative to Service and Agency program executives, officers and managers, including coordination of the Terminate, Transition, Transfer or Continue (T3C) process.

5. Deputy Director of Operations/Intelligence (DDOI). The DDOI serves as the Director’s representative to integrate warfighter Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements as well as DoD and interagency intelligence community initiatives into JCAAMP.

6. Deputy Director of Training (DDT). The DDT assists in the integration of JIEDDO capabilities into Service training, develops state of the art training initiatives and venues, and establishes and maintains protocols regarding C-IED initiatives and deploying unit training programs.
Rapid Acquisition Characteristics. JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process is characterized by:

1. Parallel Processes and Efforts. Multiple paths to arrive at an 80 percent solution to deploy, as early as practical, to the warfighter.

2. Effectively-Mitigated High Risk. Accept high risk at the beginning of the acquisition cycle to enable different approaches.

3. Schedule as the overriding focus. Schedule, not cost, is the independent variable.

4. Effective Oversight. Provide the right information at the right time for leaders to make the right decision, through a well-trained workforce and an accurate methodology.

Oversight. JIEDDO provides oversight to processes and initiatives from a variety of internal and external individuals and bodies. These checks provide transparency and accountability for initiatives as they pass through JCAAMP.

1. JIEDD Operational Requirements Assessment Board (JORAB). The JORAB is an advisory body to the Director (JIEDDO), established to serve as the initial point of entry to JCAAMP for all sources of requirements.

2. LOO Integrated Project Team (LOO IPT). The LOO IPT reviews initiatives that have been recommended to meet validated JIEDDO requirements and fill operational capability gaps.

3. JIEDD Requirements, Resources & Acquisition Board (JR2AB). The JR2AB is an advisory board to the Director (JIEDDO), established to consider all C-IED proposals to provide objective recommendations on resource and acquisition management matters.

4. JIEDD Integrated Project Team (JIPT). The JIPT is an advisory body to the Director (JIEDDO) that reviews all initiatives forwarded for consideration by the JR2AB. JIPT Members provide recommendations for action to the Director (JIEDDO) through votes on each initiative.

5. JIEDD Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG). The SRSG is an advisory body to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), established to review JIPT-recommended C-IED initiatives that are valued greater than $25 million for the entire lifecycle of the proposal and to make recommendations to the DEPSECDEF for disposition.

6. Terminate, Transition, Transfer or Continue Integrated Project Team (T3C IPT). The T3C IPT is a facilitation body that reviews all initiatives and produces an agreement between JIEDDO and a receiving Service or Agency to accept an initiative for transfer or transition. The T3C IPT may also recommend a continuation to fund an initiative for spiral improvement at DP-3. Terminations may also be agreed upon at the T3C IPT at any point in JCAAMP.

Process. JCAAMP involves the entire lifecycle of an operational need, from the initial definition of a requirement, through the development and demonstration of an initiative and procurement of a capability, and finally to the transfer, transition, termination, or continuation of a solution. It is
C-IED Strategic Plan Annex B

comprised of three Domains: Capability Requirements Validation, Solution, and Integration. JCAAMP is composed of Phases, Stages, and Decision Points.

1. Capabilities Requirements Validation (CRV) Domain. The CRV Domain consists of three Phases (Identification, Validation, and Prioritization), one Stage (Capabilities-Based Assessment) and one Decision Point (DP-0, or Requirement Validation Decision). The activities of the CRV Domain contribute to JORAB recommendations for requirement validation, and by the validation of a requirement by the DDRR.

2. Solution Domain. The Solution Domain consists of one Stage (Pre-Solution Refinement), three Phases (Development, Demonstration, and Procurement), and three Decision Points (DP-1, or Initiative Authorization Decision; DP-1D, or Release to Demonstration Decision; and DP-2, or Transition or Transfer Decision). The activities of the Solution Domain serve to develop an initiative, demonstrate the initiative in an operational environment, and/or procure a C-IED capability. Depending on the maturity of a solution, it will follow the appropriate path through the Solution Domain.

3. Integration Domain. The Integration Domain has two Phases (Sustain/Transfer and Sustain/Transition) and one Decision Point (DP-3, or Spiral Improvement). The T3C IPT coordinates JIEDDO efforts with the Services and Agencies to develop a recommendation for an initiative’s follow-on course of action at DP-3.

Process Enablers. JCAAMP is supported by three enablers: Risk Management, Continuous Evaluation, and Systemic Analysis.

1. Risk Management. Balance the project-level, program-level and portfolio-level risks associated with cost, schedule, and performance by providing monitoring and quality assurance of established policy and procedures.

2. Continuous Evaluation. Execute continuous evaluation of JIEDDO initiatives for technical performance, C-IED capability, and technical limitations based on technical threat analysis, and modeling and simulation, CONUS testing, and in-theater operational assessments.

3. Systemic Analysis. Build, continuously improve, and successfully implement institutionalized rapid acquisition processes, including robust evaluation methodologies.
Annex C: References

1. **Presidential Guidance**
   - The National Security Strategy, May 2010
   - Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 National Preparedness, 30 March 2011
   - HSPD-19 Report to the President of the United States, December 2007

2. **Department of Defense**
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