



Oral Remarks By

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Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to share my views on the improvised explosive device challenge in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. I have prepared a written statement which I would like to submit for the record.

I understand the importance of our relationship with Pakistan. And to address these IED networks that threaten our strategic interests in the region requires a cooperative engagement with Pakistan. The U.S., lead by the State Department, continues to seek a relationship with Pakistan that is constructive and advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests.

Secretary Clinton and the State Department have kept the IED issue at the forefront in discussions with Pakistan and the unified message from the U.S. government is having an impact. We have a strong partnership with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan — represented today by Mr. Carpenter. Their support and actions have significantly contributed to the increased interagency cooperation on the IED challenge, and the targeting of these threat networks operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I would like to thank the Members of this committee, especially you — Chairman Casey — for being a driving force in Congress and a steadfast advocate on this difficult Pakistan IED issue. Also, Mr. Chairman, your leadership and shepherding of the fiscal year 2013 counter-HME legislative proposal was crucial to having this important piece of legislation included in the National Defense Authorization Act. Thank you for your leadership and focus on the IED problem.

The importance of countering the threat posed by IEDs and attacking these threat networks cannot be overstated. Counter-IED is an area ripe for cooperation between the United States and Pakistan and I am encouraged by the recent positive tone in our discussions with the Government of Pakistan and the assurances from our Pakistani counterparts. But, I believe, our Pakistani partners can and must do more.

During the past two years in Afghanistan, IED events increased 80 percent, from 9,300 in 2009 to 16,800 in 2011. Even though IED events are down 8 percent this year, there have been nearly 14,500 IED events in 2012.

IEDs remain the leading cause of ISAF and Afghan casualties in Afghanistan. More than 60 percent of U.S. combat casualties in Afghanistan, both killed and wounded in action, are a result of IEDs. This year, nearly 1,900 U.S. casualties have been caused by IEDs.

It is important to note, however, this threat is not exclusive to Afghanistan. Pakistan has a significant and growing IED challenge. As of November 2012, there have been more than 900 IED attacks inside Pakistan, resulting in an excess of 3,700 casualties. So, it is in Pakistan's interest to increase counter-IED cooperation with us and take effective action against these networks.

Despite a countrywide ban on the importation of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers by the Government of Afghanistan, fertilizer-based explosives still remain our greatest challenge in Afghanistan.

Today, more than 85 percent of IEDs employed against coalition forces are homemade explosives, and of those, about 70 percent are made with ammonium nitrate

derived from calcium ammonium nitrate, referred to as CAN — a common agricultural fertilizer produced in, and transited through, Pakistan.

CAN is produced by two factories in Pakistan, owned and operated by the Fatima Group. While CAN is produced in other regional countries, I have seen no evidence to indicate the CAN used for IEDs in Afghanistan comes from any other country besides Pakistan in any significant amount.

While ammonium nitrate continues to be the most prominent main charge in HME-based IEDs in Afghanistan, the use of potassium chlorate by insurgents has increased for 12 straight months. Potassium chlorate, which is also banned for importation by the Government of Afghanistan, is legally imported into Pakistan for use by the textile and matchstick industries. It is then transferred to, or stolen by insurgents for use as IED material in Afghanistan.

In concert with our Pakistani partners we must address the continued uncontrolled flow of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers and other IED materials from Pakistan into Afghanistan. Since 2009, there has been a significant increase in IED materials seized in Afghanistan by coalition forces — from 30 tons in 2009 to 444 tons so far in 2012. The high number of IED incidents and growing seizure rates highlight the continued lack of effective measures to impede the supply of IED materials into Afghanistan from Pakistan. In Afghanistan we are playing defense.

In 2011, I engaged the top leadership of Fatima Group, the producers of CAN fertilizer in Pakistan, to urge their action in countering the illicit use of their fertilizer as an

explosive through the implementation of a dye program and instituting effective control and tracking measures. I also engaged the International Fertilizer Association and global fertilizer community to encourage the development of a whole-of-industry approach to addressing the illicit use of their products.

While international professional fertilizer associations are receptive and actively addressing these issues, the producers within Pakistan have been less than cooperative. Despite making minor packaging, tracking and marketing changes, they have not implemented any effective product security or stewardship efforts. Pakistani-based CAN producers can and must do more. Frustratingly, all direct communication and engagement with the leaders of Fatima Group was halted by the Government of Pakistan.

While the Government of Pakistan has taken military actions to address the IED threat, these efforts remain focused on Pakistan's domestic threat and have had no measurable effect on the number of IED events in Afghanistan, on the flow of HME precursor materials smuggled across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, or on the threat networks operating in Pakistan. Dialog between the United States and the Government of Pakistan on IED-related issues has been improving, but I believe there is still much work to be done. We must move from discussing cooperation to actual cooperation.

For example, in June 2011, the Government of Pakistan adopted a National Counter-IED Strategy to prevent the smuggling of calcium ammonium nitrate and other precursors out of the country. While this sounds substantial, it has neither been fully implemented nor resourced and, therefore, will have minimal affect on the IED issue.

Another example, the Government of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Act of 2012, which, in their words, “will provide the legal framework to the counter-IED strategy” has not been passed by Parliament into law, and, therefore remains unenforced.

A final example of lack of substantial action, in July, the Government of Pakistan committed to a Military-to-Military counter-IED cooperation framework. To date, despite our input, this document remains in its original draft form with no progress. This is an area where we must move beyond talking about cooperation to developing a comprehensive cooperation framework and then work together to take action to address this shared problem.

Effective and enforceable regulations and border controls are necessary and essential to mitigating this shared threat. We recognize and appreciate the actions of the Government of Pakistan to ban the exportation of products such as CAN, however, the porous borders, lack of enforcement and the high economic incentive to smuggle IED precursors render these efforts ineffective. The improved border coordination between ISAF, Pakistan and Afghanistan and the ongoing discussions on the development of a comprehensive border security strategy are encouraging. This is a critical area for cooperation that could have significant impact if it results in action.

Countering the IED threat and the networks operating on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border requires a strong partnership between the United States and Pakistan. The U.S. government needs to share with the Government of Pakistan actionable information on threat network targets of mutual interest, and in turn, the Government of Pakistan must act on the information and likewise share the critical intelligence with us

needed to counter these threat networks. Again, we note and are encouraged by recent indications of cooperation and other gestures, but we need to see real action by the Government of Pakistan against these networks.

Now, let me talk briefly about what the U.S. government is doing to address the threat networks and the IED challenge.

JIEDDO and DOD respond to the IED problem with military capabilities, but we have increasingly recognized the requirement for interagency cooperation, and cooperation with foreign governments, as essential in addressing this complex issue.

Today, we are working with an expanded counter-IED community of action that did not exist previously. We have established an interagency forum, that SRAP co-chairs, consisting of U.S. intelligence and interagency partners, federal law enforcement, key allies and our commands in Afghanistan to achieve a more effective effort to disrupt threat networks employing IEDs against U.S., ISAF and Afghan forces, and we are integrating our efforts to go after the threat networks distributing these materials. Our U.S. government partners bring expertise in

- Defeating and prosecuting criminal networks;**
- Applying financial pressures;**
- Enacting export controls and treaty compliance efforts;**
- And, advancing counter-IED objectives through public diplomacy.**

This is by no means a comprehensive list of the actions our interagency partners are applying to the counter-IED fight, but it should give an idea of the collaboration occurring on all levels.

For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce added 152 persons to the Entity List because of IED-related matters. This designation stops U.S. companies from trading with these entities — companies, organizations, persons — who violated U.S. export laws. And, the U.S. Department of Treasury has imposed economic sanctions on 38 Afghanistan-Pakistan-based facilitators, three specifically for IED-related matters. Through coordinated efforts and strong partnership across the U.S. government and with our international partners, the counter-IED community is going after these threat networks, their leaders, their funds, and facilitators — employing all of the tools at our disposal to counter the networks that employ IEDs.

Going forward, the increasingly interlinked challenges we face demands integrated and synchronized interagency effort. And, maintaining this momentum against an adaptive threat requires the continued focus of the intelligence community to build a common intelligence picture. We cannot go back to a stove-piped approach to address complex, present day threats.

In closing, I would like to highlight several points from the DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provided to Congress this month:

- Quote: “These sanctuaries in Pakistan remain the most critical operational threat to the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan**
- And, Pakistan’s passive acceptance of insurgent sanctuaries, selectivity in counterinsurgency operations that target only Pakistan-focused militants, and ineffective actions to interdict material support such as IED components to the**

insurgency, continues to undermine security in Afghanistan and threaten the ISAF campaign.” End of quote.

While we have seen recent indications of increased Pakistani cooperation and gestures on their part — Secretary Panetta recently said it best, “actions have to speak louder than words.”

The U.S. government is unified and taking action, but we cannot solve this IED challenge without the significant commitment of our Pakistani partners — government, military and industry alike.

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee, again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions and also providing you with additional information in the classified session that follows.