



**Remarks by**  
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**Good Afternoon. Thank you Major General Ishfaq for the introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, I am Brigadier General Bob Walters, Deputy Director for Operations and Intelligence at the United States Department of Defense's Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO as it is commonly known.**

**Let me first begin by thanking General Kayani and Lieutenant General Mahmood for inviting JIEDDO to speak at this counter-IED symposium. The importance of countering the threat posed by IEDs and attacking the threat networks employing these weapons cannot be overstated — so thank you for bringing us here to collaborate on ways to address this shared challenge.**

**I would also like to congratulate the people of Pakistan on the successful completion of your recent parliamentary elections. Peaceful transitions of power are significant milestones for all democratic countries — congratulations.**

**So today, I'd like to begin by providing a little background on United States counter-IED efforts and then share 10 lessons learned from more than a decade of combat operations.**

**The United States saw the threat posed by IED attacks begin to emerge shortly after NATO forces arrived in Afghanistan, but their lethality became clear in Iraq in 2003. With the increase use of IEDs, the U.S. Department of Defense established JIEDDO in 2006 to focus on the escalating IED threat.**

**JIEDDO's mission is to lead the Defense Department's actions to rapidly provide counter-IED capabilities in support of combatant commanders through rapid acquisition, tactical operations-intelligence fusion and pre-deployment training. JIEDDO is singularly focused on this problem and exists to rapidly field capabilities to reduce the effectiveness of this asymmetric weapon.**

**While IEDs cannot stop our units, or deter our commanders and soldiers from taking the fight to the enemy, these devices are the greatest source of casualties this decade. The cumulative effects of casualties, both killed and wounded in action, inflicted on our forces and magnified by insurgent information operations, have made IEDs, a challenge for the United States, and therefore a top priority for our Defense Department.**

**To counter the IED and threat networks that employ these devices, JIEDDO focuses our activities along three lines of operation: Defeat the Device, Train the Force and Attack the Network. To enable a successful counter-IED program, these lines of operation must work in harmony.**

**Our first line of operation, defeating the device, is the immediate and most obvious approach to protecting our service members from IEDs. As hard as we try, we cannot stop every IED from being employed. However, once the IED finds its way to the battlefield, we have fielded a wide spectrum of initiatives to detect the components, neutralize the triggering devices, and mitigate the effects of an IED blast.**

**Our ethos is all about rapidly delivering high-valued solutions to the warfighter. When JIEDDO was established we were provided unique authorities including flexible, multi-year funding, rapid acquisition authority and the ability for our director to approve initiatives up to \$25 million dollars without additional authorizations. These authorities allow JIEDDO to cut through bureaucratic barriers to respond quickly to warfighter urgent needs. Our goal is to deliver capabilities within 4-to-24 months.**

**We have developed and rapidly deployed a comprehensive portfolio of capabilities, such as mine rollers, electronic countermeasures (jammers), robotics, handheld detectors, pelvic protection garments, and aerial and ground surveillance systems, to name a few. We do not rely on just one**

capability. Our warfighters are provided an arsenal of tools to customize and apply to the IED threat.

The second area we focus our efforts is training. The Train the Force line of operation brings our deploying warfighters up to speed on the full range of available counter-IED tools and the latest tactics, techniques and procedures emerging from theater. A well-trained warfighter is our best counter-IED weapon. A comprehensive pre-deployment training approach is required to ensure our force has adequate time to understand the integration of all aspects of the counter-IED fight before deploying to theater.

The third line of operation, Attack the Network, is the decisive endeavor. It encompasses all the materiel and non-materiel counter-IED enablers to attack the network by first identifying, and then exploiting, critical enemy network vulnerabilities. Attacking the network is the most complex line of operation, but it is how we achieve decisive results.

JIEDDO has built a deep base of knowledge in data fusion and visualization to enable operational intelligence analysis. This analysis, in turn, enables military and interagency customers to attack violent extremist networks by using more than 200 data sources and numerous government and commercial off-the-shelf analysis tools.

The key enabler for achieving seamless sharing of information begins with applying new techniques to enhance data processing upon intake. The better we can sort or mine data, the faster our analysts can manipulate this information to produce actionable intelligence for our leaders and actionable evidence for our interagency partners.

So, that's how JIEDDO is organized to address the IED threat — three lines of operation working in harmony to achieve results.

Now, let me share with you 10 lessons learned from the past decade of combat operations where the IED, as one commander put it, “is not just a fixture on the battlefield — it is the battlefield.”

We’ve learned that many perceive IEDs as a modern phenomenon associated with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the terminology is new, the concept is not. Military forces have found and invented ingenious ways of using explosives and incendiary devices against their enemies for centuries.

However, the tactical employment methods have changed over time. Previously, mines or IEDs were used as secondary devices, complementary or enabling of other weapons — used to force the enemy into areas or situations where the main weapons could be employed. In Iraq and Afghanistan, and almost any global hot spot, the IED is the main weapon. The enemy will use live fire and other methods to lure our troops to the IEDs — inflicting mass casualties of our forces, at a minimum monetary cost to the insurgents. This is a big tactical difference, and unfortunately a tactic that is migrating globally.

Our second lesson learned is that the IED threat is not only about the device, but also the networks employing this weapon globally. With more than 700 IED events each month outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, this is a global and growing challenge. Since January 2011, there have been more than 17,000 global IED events in 123 countries executed by more than 40 regional and transnational threat networks. These statistics clearly indicate the IED will remain an enduring threat, both operationally and to our homelands for the foreseeable future.

Threat networks are learning organizations, more agile and flatter than we are. The IED is their weapon of choice because these devices are cheap, readily available, lethal, accurate, easy to construct, and comprised largely of off-the-shelf materials. Threat networks are masters of off-the-

shelf and dual-use components, using ordinary containers, commercial fertilizer, wire, discarded batteries, and scraps of wood to construct their devices.

The dual-use, off-the-shelf nature of IEDs has been one of our greatest challenges. Today, more than 80 percent of IEDs employed against coalition forces in Afghanistan are homemade explosives, often referred to as HME. And of those, about 47 percent are made with ammonium nitrate derived from calcium ammonium nitrate or CAN, despite the ban on importation by the government of Afghanistan.

While CAN has been the most prominent main charge in HME-based IEDs in Afghanistan, the use of potassium chlorate by insurgents has increased in the past year. Today, potassium chlorate is now the main charge in 45 percent of exploited IEDs, up from 20 percent a year ago.

Potassium chlorate, which is also banned for importation by the government of Afghanistan, is legally imported into neighboring countries for use by the textile and matchstick industries. It is then transferred to, or stolen by insurgents for use as the explosive element in IEDs. We believe insurgents perceive potassium chlorate as being easier to use and a more effective explosive.

In addition to the main charge, a critical piece to any IED is the initiator, a small, sensitive primary explosive device generally used to detonate a larger, more-powerful and less-sensitive secondary explosive. One type of initiator commonly used is the blasting cap.

All of our nations require companies who produce blasting caps to sell their products only to entities holding an explosives permit, such as construction or mining companies. Despite this fact, military forces are recovering these products on the battlefield. Curbing the supply of dual-use products — blasting caps, fertilizers, industrial chemicals — to insurgents, can help reduce the number of IED events.

This leads me to the third lesson learned.

**The IED threat is not just a military problem. Success against a bureaucratically unencumbered enemy requires a seamless whole-of-governments approach that integrates all partners — military, federal, state, local, private sector and multinational allies.**

**Today, JIEDDO is working with an expanded community of action for counter-IED that did not exist previously. We have established an interagency forum consisting of U.S. intelligence and interagency partners, federal law enforcement, multinational partners and forward-deployed forces to achieve a more transparent and holistic effort to disrupt threat networks employing IEDs globally.**

**We recognize no single government department or international partner has the ability to fully limit access to IED precursors, so we are integrating our efforts to go after the threat networks distributing these materials. Our partners bring expertise in**

- Defeating and prosecuting criminal networks;**
- Applying financial pressures;**
- Enacting export controls and treaty compliance efforts;**
- And, advancing counter-IED objectives through public diplomacy.**

**This is by no means a comprehensive list of the actions our partners are applying to the counter-IED fight, but it should give an idea of the collaboration occurring on all levels.**

**Building our partners counter-IED capacity is critical to a whole-of-governments approach. In coordination with our U.S. interagency partners, we have identified five different initiatives totaling approximately \$15 million dollars to build Pakistan's counter-IED capacity.**

**First, in support of the Pakistan-wide counter-IED policy, the U.S. will send personnel to conduct an exchange with the Pakistan Army, Air Force, Civil Defense and Police units focused on coordination and implementation of the counter-IED policy.**

**At the request of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the second initiative will enable the purchase of counter-IED and explosive ordnance disposal equipment for Pakistani police and bomb disposal units. This equipment will enable provincial police and civil defense teams to exploit IEDs and determine the HME precursors they contain, and develop the intelligence necessary to attack the regional threat networks.**

**The third initiative will establish End-Use Monitoring Teams to track dual-use precursors and components and ensure licit materials are not being diverted for illicit use. Through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Pakistan's customs officers will be provided the equipment necessary to conduct end-use monitoring inspections of Pakistan businesses.**

**The fourth initiative will enable the U.S. Department of Commerce to send agents to Pakistan to conduct classroom and field training on end-use checks for Customs Enforcement. This training will provide the Pakistan customs with the capability to track IED precursors and components through the supply chain and disrupt HME precursor material facilitation networks using licit items for IED development and employment.**

**Finally, the fifth initiative will fund a team from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to present a course on First Defender Explosive and Chemical Detectors. This training will increase Pakistan's capacity to detect IED precursor materials in transit.**

**These five initiatives will provide training and equipment needed to assist the government of Pakistan to coordinate and synchronize counter-IED efforts, identify and understand the illicit supply chain and develop the intelligence required to interdict HME precursor materials, and attack cross-border IED facilitation networks.**

**In June 2011, the government of Pakistan adopted a national counter-IED strategy to**

- Prevent the smuggling of CAN and other precursors out of the country;**
- Build Pakistan's counter-IED capacity through equipping and training;**

- **Launch a vigorous counter-IED public awareness campaign;**
- **And, modify and strengthen existing legislative framework on terrorism and explosives.**

**Counter-IED strategies such as the one adopted by the government of Pakistan are important tools for an effective whole-of-governments approach. Global partners in the IED fight should implement effective counter-IED strategies.**

**Additionally, effective military-to-military counter-IED cooperation frameworks are a valuable tool to establish a coordinated response. On May 6, JIEDDO's Director, who retired last week, Lieutenant General Michael Barbero and Pakistani Army's Chairman of CIEDO, Major General Muhammad Rafiq Sabir, signed a jointly developed military-to-military counter-IED cooperation framework to solidify our partnership in addressing the shared IED threat.**

**This framework will improve information sharing, build counter-IED capacity in Pakistan and educate the population of Pakistan on the IED threat. By rapidly implementing the tasks agreed to in the action plan, we will produce real results.**

**As I mentioned, the complex nature of the global IED threat requires the support of the private sector. JIEDDO engaged the International Fertilizer Association, the Fatima Group, the Pakistani-based producers of calcium ammonium nitrate, and global fertilizer community to gain their commitment in countering the illicit use of fertilizer as an explosive. JIEDDO asked this community to develop a whole-of-industry approach to safeguard their products from illicit use.**

**In 2012, the International Fertilizer Association stood up a product security task force to map out a path forward for enhanced product security and public awareness measures and the Fatima Group began the implementation of multiple improvements to its distribution procedures, packaging and tracking program to ensure its fertilizer is delivered to legitimate end users. These**

are significant steps in self-regulation and demonstrate how non-traditional partners can be valuable leaders in preventing the loss of life.

JIEDDO strives to leverage the capabilities and authorities of all stakeholders impacted by the shared IED threat, and industry is a key partner. Moving forward, we hope to build on the successful partnership with the global fertilizer industry by expanding this whole-of-industry approach to other producers of legitimate products being used in IEDs such as commercial grade explosives producers and blasting cap manufactures.

The fourth lesson learned is that there are two counter-IED fights — the dismounted fight and mounted fight. Each requires unique capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures to be successful. We must equip and train appropriately.

The fifth lesson we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan is that tactical patience is paramount. Unit leaders must accept the fact that slow, deliberate movements offer the best chance of finding and clearing IEDs, as opposed to detonating them and taking casualties.

The sixth lesson learned is to avoid chokepoints wherever possible. Go over a wall instead of through a gate. Walk through a stream instead of over a bridge. If the terrain is suitable, avoid roadways and paths.

Our seventh lesson learned is the value of training — this is actually a lesson re-learned. Our best counter-IED weapon is a well-trained Soldier or policeman. Most IEDs are found by the human eye. Soldiers must develop and continually apply ground sign awareness by identifying what looks odd or out of place.

Additionally, training must accompany innovation. We can provide the best and most innovative counter-IED capabilities to our warfighters, law enforcement and first responders, but without the up-front and relevant training component, the full capacity of equipment and tactics will never be achieved.

**The final three lessons learned I will share with you today, directly support our decisive attack the network efforts.**

**Attacking threat networks through the centrality of money is the eighth lesson learned. Money is the lifeblood of these networks, so we must attack threat networks where it hurts most — their bank accounts.**

**In direct support of the operational commander, JIEDDO leverages traditional and non-traditional data-sets to illuminate disruptive opportunities against IED facilitation networks. Some of those data sources include open source, bulk data, social media, public financial data, forensic accounting, auditing, data mining, and domestic and international legal support.**

**We identify key IED-related procurement, facilitators, accounts, and financial institutions to enable whole-of-governments pressure. The ultimate goal of operational threat finance is to convert intelligence into evidence. Identifying the junction points and nexus between money, geography, IED materials, social networks, legitimate entities, and government is a difficult challenge — but when successful, we will disrupt global threat networks employing IEDs.**

**Our ninth lesson learned is the benefit of actionable operational intelligence products. Our ability to fuse operational information and intelligence, from all sources, to produce actionable intelligence — analytical products that meet the needs of both our operational commanders and domestic security partners has enabled effective and decisive attack the network operations.**

**JIEDDO applies a suite of innovative tools to enable analysts to organize intelligence from more than 200 data sources, resolve identities, correlate events, research patterns of life and geospatially render this information on a map to produce a blended intelligence picture that directly supports operations.**

**Fusing operational information and intelligence is accomplished through a robust and powerful network of partners with whom analytical tools, methodologies and most importantly,**

**information and intelligence, can be shared to identify, and then exploit, the vulnerabilities of threat networks.**

**The tenth and final lesson learned I would like to share with you is the benefit of weapons technical intelligence or WTI. This capability enables military forces to conduct relevant and timely collection, analysis and technical and forensic exploitation of current and emerging IED technologies. During the past eight years, JIEDDO, in conjunction with the military services, U.S. interagency and our multinational partners developed the highly effective WTI process to target extremist networks and defeat the IED.**

**Emerging technologies such as standoff biometric collection, rapid DNA processing, and real-time latent fingerprint matching hold enormous potential to advance the WTI process into the next generation of protection. These capabilities will allow security personnel to identify threats before they reach checkpoints and to instantaneously attribute criminal and illicit activities to the perpetrators.**

**The benefit of the WTI process has unlimited potential and applicability to defeat improvised weapon systems that provide our enemies an asymmetric advantage. Our commanders increasingly focus operations to collect biometric data and several have referred to it as a “game-changer.” Biometric, forensic and technical exploitation remove a violent extremist’s greatest defense — anonymity — and makes them vulnerable to attribution, which is why the WTI capability must endure.**

**In closing, it takes many organizations and initiatives working in harmony to defeat threat networks using IEDs. There is empirical evidence that, as threat networks migrate, their weapon of choice follows. These weapons are being used by threat networks in Syria, Mali, Algeria, Somalia and every other global hotspot, and I see no change in the near future.**

**We must continue to increase cooperation and coordination with all partners in the counter-IED fight. Global threat networks are not going to cease operations or IED development following the departure of coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Their weapon of choice—the IED—has proven to be too effective, cheap and easy to make. So, moving forward, it’s imperative we capture the hard-earned knowledge, expertise and lessons learned from 10 plus years of conflict, institutionalize them and share them with our security partners. It’s the only way to stay ahead of the ever-evolving threat environment and imaginative bomb makers.**

**Again, thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you today and for your efforts to address this security challenge. I encourage you to keep pressing on and remain focused on this issue — lives truly depend on it.**

**I appreciate your time and attention and I look forward to your questions during the upcoming discussion period.**